Policy making, to be effective, requires assessments of magnitudes and trends of major events based on evidence. One of the objectives of government policy interventions is—or should be—to pick up and stem slides in standards of living when they occur. For a stubbornly poverty-stricken country such as India, this function of the state assumes even greater significance when calamities, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, descend on the populace. Although the Government of India is yet to release data on the population pushed into poverty as a result of the pandemic, research organisations—both national and international—have attempted to study this important link. These studies throw light on the important issue of arriving at estimates of the numbers of people that might have been pushed into poverty as a consequence of COVID-19, and therefore on the magnitude of the problem confronting any conscientious policy-maker. The first of the two estimates assessed in this essay is due to researchers at the Pew Research Centre (PRC) in the U.S., and the second to researchers at the Centre for Sustainable Employment at Azim Premji University (APU) in India. In this Issue Brief, S. Subramanian, Economist, and author of Inequality and Poverty: A Short Critical Introduction, and other books on poverty, seeks to reconstruct the assumptions and data inputs that have gone into the making of the estimates under review. Analysing the estimates, which suggest vastly differing outcomes, he discusses the manner in which poverty figures are arrived at to provide a quantitative picture of economic deprivation. In the immediate context, and on the basis of such data as are available, he concludes that it could be reasonably estimated, in line with the APU study, that anywhere upward of 200 million people may have slid into poverty after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. This finding assumes importance as an aspect of evidence-based assessment of the economic devastation that has accompanied the pandemic. It points even more specifically to the role of the state, or its relative absence, in safeguarding its peoples from a once-in-a-century, long-drawn out catastrophe which has persisted for over a year. Behind these numbers are real people, whose predicament would have been better served by a state with a mind to basing policy intervention on evidence, not least when such research evidence is available in the public domain. Even based on a partial assessment, the two main pandemic responses by the government – a hastily declared lockdown and reluctantly ad-hoc relief measures – have resulted in “grievously harsh” consequences for India and its fight against poverty. By highlighting the outcomes of two earlier significant research efforts, Subramanian invites attention to importantly required numbers that would enable policy makers to get a sense of the enormity of the deprivation that has been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  [PDF 438 KB]

The call for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has long featured on the agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and found mention in its manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The issue is not new either for the BJP or for Indian politics: it has been at the centre – and sidelines – of political and legislative debates for well over a century and a half. The BJP was the first party in the country to promise the implementation of UCC if it were to be elected into power. Now that it holds the reins of power, it may be a matter of days before the subject leapfrogs from the cycle of debates to actual law. The urgency seems unavoidable given the ruling party’s recent history with regard to the revocation of Article 370, rendering all forms of talaq to be void, in the context of the talaq-i-biddat, and the determination it has shown towards the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya. Keeping in mind the right wing political narrative dominant in the country, the recent pronouncements made in political quarters as well as by the Supreme Court, C.K. Mathew, who was Chief Secretary of Rajasthan before retiring from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), traces the trajectory of the UCC debate, linking it to the contentious evolution of the Hindu Code Bill, and other key developments since independence, such as the Shah Bano case. He draws also attention to international experiences from Rome, France, and the UK and other countries, including the Islamic nations. Mathew accepts that UCC has been a long-pending matter and also that it is arguably a necessary push in the direction of equity and freedom, especially with regard to gender. And yet he advises caution in applying it to a diverse people with varying degrees of religious sensibilities. The way forward, he says, is not to force it on an unwilling people but to follow the middle path of voluntary adoption, as once suggested by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India and the country’s first Law Minister, B.R. Ambedkar: "It is perfectly possible that the future parliament may make a provision by way of making a beginning that the Code shall apply only to those who make a declaration that they are prepared to be bound by it, so that in the initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary ."  [Emphasis by author.] Issue Brief No. 10 (HTML) [PDF 498 KB]

Thoothukudi, in southern Tamil Nadu, found its place in recorded history preceding even that of the State’s capital, Chennai. Famed as one among the world’s ancient seaports documented by the likes of Ptolemy, it is now in the news for all that can go wrong in the dynamic interplay of the state and citizenry, industrialisation and the environment, and governance and public interest. On May 22, 2018, police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators who had been protesting against a copper smelter plant, which for close to two decades was mired in controversy over its impact on the environment, public health, and the manner in which the state was seen as siding with corporate interests overriding public concerns. The police action on the 100 day of the protests went down as an emotive experience in which public voices were stilled by bullets, governance was all but abdicated by civil authorities, and, in a seeming response to the popular outcry, the smelter, run by Sterlite Copper, a subsidiary of Vedanta, a global mining conglomerate was shut down. In this Issue Brief , M.G. Devasahayam, former Indian Army and Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, puts together the pieces and focusses the spotlight on the failure of state mechanisms, leading to the government resorting to “Governance by Fear.” Drawing from his experience as an administrator and soldier he points out the serious flaws in the handling of the entire issue by the political leadership, executive and the judiciary. He dissects the order under Section 144 CrPC and exposes its illegality, draws attention to the procedural blunders and the disproportionate role played by the uniformed force of the State, and the manner in which what started out as an expression of collective dissent ended in a tragedy which claimed the lives of 13 people and the limbs of many more. The Issue Brief also delves into the growing trend of the seemingly democratic state becoming brazenly autocratic to facilitate the “ruling oligarchy grow richer while their less fortunate brethren suffer and starve” a sure sign of the State not being governed as per the mandate of the Constitution of India. Click to read this Issue Brief (HTML)

This Issue Brief is an attempt to understand the challenges before the health system in India and why these challenges persist. The year 2016 and 2017 in particular witnessed a series of tragedies so horrendous and widespread that they brought to light the deplorable state of the public health system in India. It was expected that some lessons will be drawn from the public health crisis in 2016, and that the year 2017 would fare better. However, the incidents repeated themselves in different parts of the country. In 2016, a poor farmer in Odisha was forced to carry his wife’s corpse many miles in the absence of a support system. This year witnessed a similar incident in Uttar Pradesh. Likewise, 2016 saw the outbreak of chikungunya in Delhi and this year dengue and chikungunya infection broke out in Tamil Nadu and Kerala followed by the death of approximately 77 children due to encephalitis in Gorakhpur district of Uttar Pradesh in August 2017. Though a public health system cannot be refurbished in a time span of one year, these public health emergencies establish the chronic nature of ailments affecting the system. Various studies have found that the Indian health system is besieged by inadequate infrastructure, paucity of skilled human resources, inadequate drug and medical supply, lack of preparedness, all of these further burdened by an increase in communicable, non-communicable, and vector borne diseases. It is a further worry that at a time when the public health system is already in a bad shape and we have humongous Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to achieve, the government is withdrawing from providing health services and encouraging the private sector to play a greater role. A glaring feature of public health delivery today is the government’s unwillingness to increase funding and prioritise public health. Increasing cost of medication, high out-of- pocket expenditure, and corruption in the health system have adversely affected public health and have combined to cripple the public health sector . In order to better understand the Union government’s approach to public health, the Issue Brief views the above underscored challenges against the gap between the Draft National Health Policy of 2015 and the final National Health Policy of 2017 on the one hand, and the 2015 policy, and the Union Budget 2017-18 on the other. The Issue Brief finally makes a set of recommendations to plug the gaps in public health delivery towards fulfilling the SDGs expected to be achieved over 15 years. Click to read this Issue Brief (HTML) [PDF 3.16 MB]

It has become an article of faith with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that elections must be held concurrently to the Lok Sabha and the State assemblies – ostensibly to achieve the twin-objectives of minimising the expenses involved and eliminating the disruption caused to governance and development goals by frequent elections. The idea of a single common election originated in the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 2014 election manifesto and has since been taken up vigorously on multiple forums, among them the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, the Election Commission of India, the Niti Ayog, the Law Commission and at internal meetings of the BJP. As Jagdeep Chhokar, a founding member of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR), points out in this Issue Brief, although Modi has disavowed a direct role in pushing the idea, his imprint is clearly visible in the sequence of events aimed at kick-starting the exercise as well as in the urgency shown by the various arms of the government, not to mention an autonomous institution like the Election Commission: “Modi himself nudged and pushed the idea at every stage and on every institution”. As an example of the pressure that institutions have been facing on supporting and advocating simultaneous polls, the author cites the divergence in the views of former President, Pranab Mukherjee, held while in office and after retirement. As President, Mukherjee endorsed the holding of combined polls but on retirement rejected the same idea as undemocratic and against the interests of the States. In this Issue Brief, Chhokar questions the submissions made in favour of combining Union and State elections and holds the move to be seriously flawed – both conceptually and in terms of its practicality. The exercise will require extensive amendments to the Constitution which will upset the balance of power between the States and the Union in the latter’s favour. This encroachment into federal rights has the potential to alter the basic structure of the Constitution, which has been held to be inviolable by the Supreme Court. In practical terms, it will mean artificially cutting short or extending the terms of elected assemblies which strikes at the root of Parliamentary democracy. The author asks whether the conduct of elections, intrinsic to the survival and life of a democracy can be sacrificed at the altar of ‘development’ or administrative compulsions. Chhokar also dismisses the argument that the Model Code of Conduct enforced in the run up to elections is an interference in governance by pointing out that the code imposed no restrictions that affect governance. On the spiralling cost of holding elections, a reason cited repeatedly by the proponents of synchronised polls, Chhokar asks: “Should the nation be looking to create the ‘most effective’ democracy or the ‘least expensive’ democracy?”

Thoothukudi, in southern Tamil Nadu, found its place in recorded history preceding even that of the State’s capital, Chennai. Famed as one among the world’s ancient seaports documented by the likes of Ptolemy, it is now in the news for all that can go wrong in the dynamic interplay of the state and citizenry, industrialisation and the environment, and governance and public interest.On May 22, 2018, police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators who had been protesting against a copper smelter plant, which for close to two decades was mired in controversy over its impact on the environment, public health, and the manner in which the state was seen as siding with corporate interests overriding public concerns.The police action on the 100 day of the protests went down as an emotive experience in which public voices were stilled by bullets, governance was all but abdicated by civil authorities, and, in a seeming response to the popular outcry, the smelter, run by Sterlite Copper, a subsidiary of Vedanta, a global mining conglomerate was shut down.In this Issue Brief , M.G. Devasahayam, former Indian Army and Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, puts together the pieces and focusses the spotlight on the failure of state mechanisms, leading to the government resorting to “Governance by Fear.” Drawing from his experience as an administrator and soldier he points out the serious flaws in the handling of the entire issue by the political leadership, executive and the judiciary. He dissects the order under Section 144 CrPC and exposes its illegality, draws attention to the procedural blunders and the disproportionate role played by the uniformed force of the State, and the manner in which what started out as an expression of collective dissent ended in a tragedy which claimed the lives of 13 people and the limbs of many more.The Issue Brief also delves into the growing trend of the seemingly democratic state becoming brazenly autocratic to facilitate the “ruling oligarchy grow richer while their less fortunate brethren suffer and starve” a sure sign of the State not being governed as per the mandate of the Constitution of India.

Policy making, to be effective, requires assessments of magnitudes and trends of major events based on evidence.  One of the objectives of government policy interventions is—or should be—to pick up and stem slides in standards of living when they occur.   For a stubbornly poverty-stricken country such as India, this function of the state assumes even greater significance when calamities, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, descend on the populace.  Although the Government of India is yet to release data on the population pushed into poverty as a result of the pandemic, research organisations—both national and international—have attempted to study this important link.  These studies throw light on the important issue of arriving at estimates of the numbers of people that might have been pushed into poverty as a consequence of COVID-19, and therefore on the magnitude of the problem confronting any conscientious policy-maker. The first of the two estimates assessed in this essay is due to researchers at the Pew Research Centre (PRC) in the U.S., and the second to researchers at the Centre for Sustainable Employment at Azim Premji University (APU) in India.  In this Issue Brief, S. Subramanian, Economist, and author of Inequality and Poverty: A Short Critical Introduction, and other books on poverty, seeks to reconstruct the assumptions and data inputs that have gone into the making of the estimates under review.  Analysing the estimates, which suggest vastly differing outcomes, he discusses the manner in which poverty figures are arrived at to provide a quantitative picture of economic deprivation.  In the immediate context, and on the basis of such data as are available, he concludes that it could be reasonably estimated, in line with the APU study, that anywhere upward of 200 million people may have slid into poverty after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. This finding assumes importance as an aspect of evidence-based assessment of the economic devastation that has accompanied the pandemic.  It points even more specifically to the role of the state, or its relative absence, in safeguarding its peoples from a once-in-a-century, long-drawn out catastrophe which has persisted for over a year. Behind these numbers are real people, whose predicament would have been better served by a state with a mind to basing policy intervention on evidence, not least when such research evidence is available in the public domain.  Even based on a partial assessment, the two main pandemic responses by the government – a hastily declared lockdown and reluctantly ad-hoc relief measures – have resulted in "grievously harsh" consequences for India and its fight against poverty.  By highlighting the outcomes of two earlier significant research efforts, Subramanian invites attention to importantly required numbers that would enable policy makers to get a sense of the enormity of the deprivation that has been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. HTML version [PDF 438 KB]

Policy making, to be effective, requires assessments of magnitudes and trends of major events based on evidence.  One of the objectives of government policy interventions is—or should be—to pick up and stem slides in standards of living when they occur.   For a stubbornly poverty-stricken country such as India, this function of the state assumes even greater significance when calamities, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, descend on the populace.  Although the Government of India is yet to release data on the population pushed into poverty as a result of the pandemic, research organisations—both national and international—have attempted to study this important link.  These studies throw light on the important issue of arriving at estimates of the numbers of people that might have been pushed into poverty as a consequence of COVID-19, and therefore on the magnitude of the problem confronting any conscientious policy-maker. The first of the two estimates assessed in this essay is due to researchers at the Pew Research Centre (PRC) in the U.S., and the second to researchers at the Centre for Sustainable Employment at Azim Premji University (APU) in India.  In this Issue Brief, S. Subramanian, Economist, and author of Inequality and Poverty: A Short Critical Introduction, and other books on poverty, seeks to reconstruct the assumptions and data inputs that have gone into the making of the estimates under review.  Analysing the estimates, which suggest vastly differing outcomes, he discusses the manner in which poverty figures are arrived at to provide a quantitative picture of economic deprivation.  In the immediate context, and on the basis of such data as are available, he concludes that it could be reasonably estimated, in line with the APU study, that anywhere upward of 200 million people may have slid into poverty after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. This finding assumes importance as an aspect of evidence-based assessment of the economic devastation that has accompanied the pandemic.  It points even more specifically to the role of the state, or its relative absence, in safeguarding its peoples from a once-in-a-century, long-drawn out catastrophe which has persisted for over a year. Behind these numbers are real people, whose predicament would have been better served by a state with a mind to basing policy intervention on evidence, not least when such research evidence is available in the public domain.  Even based on a partial assessment, the two main pandemic responses by the government – a hastily declared lockdown and reluctantly ad-hoc relief measures – have resulted in “grievously harsh” consequences for India and its fight against poverty.  By highlighting the outcomes of two earlier significant research efforts, Subramanian invites attention to importantly required numbers that would enable policy makers to get a sense of the enormity of the deprivation that has been caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. THE PRC ESTIMATE III. THE APU ESTIMATE IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRC AND APU ESTIMATES V. CONCLUDING NOTE   I. INTRODUCTION This will be, for the most part, a data-and-methodology-related essay concerned with a seemingly antiseptic assessment of the possible impact of the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic on the magnitude of income-poverty in India.  The concern is not only with a pandemic of historic magnitude, but also of a policy orientation that may have resulted in anywhere upwards of 200 million Indians sliding into poverty as a result of COVID-19 and the response to it. The focus of this essay will be on numbers and counting, and on the assumptions underlying these in an environment of scanty data accessed from different sources.  In order to tell a narrative involving numbers, one can either focus on the manner in which they are derived, or shine the spotlight on the story that lies behind, and is reflected by, the data.  In the present essay, the relative weight of emphasis is laid on the first of these two orientations, just so that the restricted focus of the exercise is preserved in the manner of its treatment.  I shall confine commentary to a few observations, and not least because the numbers leave little room for any elaborately articulated opinion that is not immediately suggested by the quantitative evidence. In what follows, I shall try and spell out, as clearly as I am able to, the method by which the poverty numbers dealt with in this essay can be derived.  These poverty numbers relate to the estimates that have been advanced in two earlier studies. 1.1 Different estimates of people pushed into poverty The first study is one by the Pew Research Center (PRC), Washington, D. C., USA (Kochhar, 2021), and the second is due to the Azim Premji University (APU), Bengaluru, India (APU, 2021).  The two studies come up with vastly differing estimates of the additional numbers of people precipitated into poverty during the course of the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic in India.  This, as might be expected, is on account of the differing data sets employed in the two studies.  My effort is essentially to try and reconstruct these data sets, on the basis of the methodological guidelines available in the two respective studies. At one level, the effort may be justified simply in terms of the importance of keeping alive, in the public domain, the findings on pandemic and poverty revealed by the studies.  They are of such vital contemporary significance that they must not be allowed to simply slip into forgetfulness or past history. Apart from this, there is a case for a painstaking—even plodding—expository exercise aimed at enabling laypersons and younger researchers to get a sense of the manner and method by which estimates of the sort discussed here are arrived at. In this justification, the focus is on the intrinsic utility of explanation, appraisal, and criticism. The two studies come up with vastly differing estimates of the additional numbers of people precipitated into poverty during first wave of the pandemic. My reconstruction does not yield results identical to the studies’ results, but the relevant sets of results are close enough to those in the originals. I should clarify, and reiterate, that the assumptions and input data sets I have attributed to the two studies are a product of my reconstruction of the methodological directions provided in the two studies, and any deviation there may be of my reconstruction from the actually employed methodology is certainly not due to wilful misattribution, but rather to obvious imperfections in my reconstruction.  In particular, when I speak of the ‘Pew Research Centre’ and the 'Azim Premji University' data sets, I refer to my reconstructions of these data sets. Links to the studies by these organisations are provided under References. 1.2 Constructing poverty ratios With these preliminary clarificatory remarks out of the way, it is useful to begin by asking: what, typically, are the data one would need in order to estimate the headcount ratio of poverty (the proportion of the population that is poor)?  It is useful to address this question because there are software computing packages available which can convert the requisite data into processed summary statistics of relevance to one’s interest.  One such package is a readily accessible programme maintained by the World Bank, 'POVCALNET', which enables its user to feed in certain relevant data, which the programme processes. It then returns, by way of output, the headcount ratio of poverty (apart from a host of other related statistics on measures of central tendency and dispersion, such as the mean, the Gini coefficient of inequality, and a number of poverty indices).  There are, typically, three items of data which the POVCALNET programme seeks, as enumerated and explained below 1 : The Income Distribution ( D ) . There are different ways in which income distribution data can be presented.  A particularly convenient form is one which indicates the cumulative income share of each cumulated decile of the population, arranged from poorest to richest.  That is, the data are presented in such a way that we have information on the income share of the poorest 10 per cent of the population, the income share of the poorest 20 per cent, the income share of the poorest 30 per cent,…, and so on, until we have accounted for all 100 per cent of the population.  The income distribution is thus essentially depicted in a two-column table in which the first column lists the cumulated deciles of the population in ascending order of income and the second provides the cumulated income share corresponding to each cumulated population share. The Poverty Line (z) . The poverty line is a level of income such that all persons with incomes less than this level are considered to be poor . The Mean Income of the Distribution (m) . This is just the average income of the reference population. Once we feed these three inputs—namely D , z, and m —into the POVCALNET programme, it will tell us the associated headcount ratio of poverty for the given combination of income distribution, poverty line and mean income 2 . All of this is simple enough.  The practical problem is to find the data on D and m , and to construct a reasonably convincing poverty line, z , which does the intended job of specifying a level of income that experience and judgement would endorse as an acceptable poverty line.  These inputs are not readily available in the forms in, and for the time-periods for, which they would be required for constructing a picture of the impact of COVID-19 on the magnitude of poverty.  Therefore, in order to assemble the needed information on the vital triad ( D , z , and m ) for any appropriate period (in this instance, the pre- and post-pandemic periods), a researcher would need to make certain assumptions and have resort to alternative sources of data.. Return to Contents II. THE PRC ESTIMATE As noted at the end of the introductory chapter, any assessment of changes in poverty on account of COVID-19 would depend crucially on our precise choice of the data inputs D , z, and m .  At least one earlier effort at such an assessment for India (and indeed for other countries and the world as a whole) is due to the work of social scientists at the PRC, an institution which describes itself as a ‘non-partisan fact tank’, located in Washington, D.C., U.S. (see Kochhar, 2021) The Pew study estimates that an additional 75 million Indians may have been pushed into poverty after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The income distribution employed in this study is India’s 2011 consumer expenditure distribution, as available from the National Statistical Office (NSO), and the poverty line is taken to be the World Bank’s international poverty line of $2 at 2011 Purchasing Power Parity prices (converted to national currency and updated to take account of inflation). The ‘pre-COVID-19’ mean income is calculated on the basis of the World Bank’s (relatively optimistic) projection, made in January 2020, of the annual growth rate for 2019-2020.  The ‘post-COVID-19’ mean is calculated on the basis of the World Bank’s (considerably depressed) estimate of this growth rate, made in January 2021. On the basis of these assumptions regarding D , z, and m , the Pew study estimates that an additional 75 million Indians may have been pushed into poverty after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The following three sub-sections present, in slightly greater detail, what I take to be the assumptions regarding the data inputs D , z, and m used in the PRC study.   2.1 The PRC Income Distribution Input  As is well known, there are no systematic data available on the distribution of incomes in India.  What we do have is information, from the quinquennial surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Organization’s (CSO’s) NSO, on the distribution of household consumption expenditure 3 .  The latest official survey data pertain to the 68 Round of the NSO for the year 2011-12.  It is these distributional data which seem to have been employed in the PRC analysis as a proxy for India’s 2020 income distribution.   It should be mentioned that the 68 Round survey employs three ‘recall periods’, referred to, respectively, as the ‘uniform recall period’ (URP), the ‘mixed recall period’ (MRP), and the ‘modified mixed recall period’ (MMRP). Recall periods are important building blocks as they provide information on the expenses incurred by a household over specific time blocs, say a month or a year 4 . I take it that the distributional data employed in the PRC study correspond to the MRP estimates.  The distributions are assumed to be the same for both the pre-COVID-19 and the post-COVID-19 periods. Table 1, which is derived from the National Sample Survey Organization’s 2011-12 data on rural and urban consumption distributions, summarises our data input on D . Table 1: Imputed Rural and Urban Income Distributions for 2020 Based on Corresponding Consumer Expenditure Distributions from National Sample Survey Data for 2011-12 (PRC) Related content   Note: G stands for the Gini coefficient of inequality. Gini coefficients range from 0 to 1, representing perfect equality and inequality, respectively. Therefore, the higher the Gini coefficient, the greater the inequality. Source: Derived from data in Tables 1BR and 1BU of National Sample Survey (2014): Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure 2011-12 , NSS 68 Round, National Sample Survey Office, MoSPI, GoI, February 2014. It should be added that there are obvious caveats that must be issued about the use of consumption expenditure distributions as proxies for income distributions, which the PRC study acknowledges.  For one thing, consumption distributions are typically less unequal than income distributions.  For another, the same distributions are employed for both ‘pre-COVID-19’ and ‘post-COVID-19’ situations, which does not take into account the possibility that the impact of the pandemic on inequality might have been regressive.  Thirdly, the consumption distribution data pertain to 2011-12, and the consumption distribution—especially in the urban areas of the country—has displayed a tendency to become more unequal over time.  Having said this, there are situations in which—after a due observation of the attendant limitations of the exercise—one is constrained to employ the data that are available, in a spirit of not allowing the feasible ‘mixed good’ to defeat an unattainable ‘first best’.  On this score, at least, the PRC study cannot be faulted. 2.2 The PRC Poverty Line Input (z) The World Bank’s international poverty line is pegged at $1.90 per person per day at 2011 Purchasing Power Parity Exchange (PPP) rates.  The PRC study employs a poverty line of $2.00.  (A discussion of the merits of this poverty line is deferred to a later stage.) From Table 2.4 of World Bank (2015) 5 , we find that $1 was equivalent, in PPP exchange terms, to ₹15.11 in 2011. An international poverty line of $2.00 would, therefore, translate to ₹30.22 per person per day, or, multiplying by 30 days, to ₹906.60 per person per month. This is taken to be the poverty line for both rural and urban India. Applying the Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL), we obtain a rural poverty line of ₹1,478 per person per month at 2020 prices. Applying the Consumer Price Index of Industrial Workers (CPIIW), we obtain an urban poverty line of ₹1514 per person per month at 2019 prices. (The rural price index is estimated to have increased by a factor of 1.63 from 2011 to 2020, and the urban price index by a factor of 1.67 from 2011 to 2019: these factors are derived from RBI data on prices. 6 Our reconstruction of the poverty line ( z ) input data in the PRC study is summarised in Table 2: Table 2: Rural and Urban Poverty Lines per Person per Month (in ₹) in 2020 at Current Prices (PRC) Rural Poverty Line Urban Poverty Line 1,478 1,514 Source: Author’s calculations. 2.3 The PRC Mean Incomes Input (m) Here is my reconstruction of the PRC methodology for deriving rural and urban ‘pre-COVID-19’ and ‘post-COVID-19’ means for 2020, on the basis of my interpretation of the methodology as outlined in Kochhar (2021). First, we note that the 68 Round NSO estimates of average per capita consumption expenditure in 2011-12, at 2011-12 prices, are: ₹1,287.17 for rural India, and ₹2,477.02 for urban India 7 .  The PRC method consists, first, in using these estimates in the benchmark year, 2011-12, to estimate what their values might have been in 2019 if they had grown at the same rate as real per capita GDP over the period 2012 to 2019.  World Bank data 8 suggest that India’s per capita GDP at constant local currency units increased by a factor of 1.4644 from 2012 to 2019: applying this growth factor to the 2011-12 NSO estimates of mean consumption yields rural and urban estimates for 2019 of ₹1,885.58 and ₹3,628.59 respectively, at 2011-12 prices. It remains to proceed from 2019 to 2020, which requires us to consider the World Bank’s projections in this regard. In January 2020 before the outbreak of the pandemic, the World Bank projected a growth rate of 5.8 per cent on the 2019 per capita GDP for 2020, which, in the light of the economic effects of the outbreak, was revised downward to (-) 9.6 per cent in January 2021.  We can now envisage a counterfactual situation of what the rural and urban means might have been in 2020 in the absence of the pandemic, by applying the growth-rate of 5.8 per cent to the estimated 2019 rural and urban means of ₹1,885.58 and ₹3,628.59 respectively, to yield ₹1,994.94 and ₹3,839.05 respectively, at 2011-2012 prices.  By applying the inflation factors, mentioned earlier, of 1.63 for the rural areas and 1.67 for the urban areas respectively, we can postulate the counterfactual ‘pre-COVID-19’ means, in 2020 prices, to be ₹3,251 (= ₹1,994.94x1.63) for rural India and Rs. 6410 (= 3839.05x1.67) for urban India. In similar manner, and after applying the growth rate of (-) 9.6 per cent to the 2019 estimates of means, followed by adjustment for inflation, we can obtain estimates of the ‘post-COVID-19’ means, in 2020, at 2020 prices, of ₹2,778 for rural India and ₹5,477 for urban India. Table 3 summarises what I take to be the PRC estimates of the rural and urban means in 2020, pre-and post-COVID-19:   Table 3: Pre- and Post-COVID-19 Rural and Urban Average Incomes (in ₹) in 2020 at Current Prices (PRC) Pre-COVID-19 Rural Mean Post-COVID-19 Rural Mean Pre-COVID-19 Urban Mean Post-COVID-19 Urban Mean 3,251 2,778 6,410 5,477   Source: Author’s calculations as indicated in text.           2.4 Results from the PRC Input Data I first summarise my reconstruction of the PRC study’s input data in Table 4.   Table 4: Summary of PRC Study’s Reconstructed Input Data on Distributions, Poverty Lines and Means: 2020 Related content   Source: Based on the numbers in Tables 1-3. The POVCALNET software programme returns the relevant headcount ratios, as furnished in Table 5, for the input data summarised in Table 4, from which one can calculate the changes in both the headcount ratios and aggregate headcounts attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, separately for the rural and the urban areas. I have assumed an all-India population of 1,360 million for 2020, split between the rural and urban areas in the proportions of 65 per cent and 35 per cent respectively. Table 5: Levels and Changes in Headcount Ratios and Aggregate Headcounts Attributable to COVID-19, using the PRC Study’s Reconstructed Input Data   Rural Pre-COVID-19 Rural Post-COVID-19 Rural Change Urban Pre-COVID-19 Urban Post-COVID-19 Urban Change Total Change Headcount Ratio .0723 .1499 .0776 0 .0162 .0162 .0561 Aggregate Headcount (in millions) 63.91 132.51 68.60 0 7.71 7.71 76.31 Source: Author’s calculations based on the input data summarised in Table 5. The incremental number of persons plunged into poverty by the COVID-19 pandemic is 76.31 million (final entry in Table 5), which tallies quite closely with the PRC study’s estimate of 75 million.  Further comments are reserved for a later part of this note.  We now attempt to reconstruct the APU study’s estimate.  Return to Contents III. THE APU ESTIMATE The APU estimate of incremental poverty attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic is contained in the report State of Working India 2021: One Year of Covid (APU, 2021).  This remarkable production is the third in a series on the ' State of Working India' ; earlier reports having appeared in 2018 and 2019.  The present (2021) edition places a special emphasis on the impact of and policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Work on these reports has been carried out under the coordination of a group of researchers in Azim Premji University’s Centre for Sustainable Employment (CSE).  The engagement is with the condition of the labouring poor, and the 2021 report provides an extraordinarily detailed account of the general state of the economy, with a focus on lives, livelihoods, incomes, nutrition and living standards, as these have been affected by the pandemic, together with an analysis of policy response (mainly policy failure) and recommendations for meaningful government intervention.   This report, and the series of which it is a part, will stand out as an exemplary model of the collection, collation, processing and analysis of data drawn from diverse sources, and of serious scholarly application, humane engagement, and committed effort in the cause of understanding the condition of India’s labouring poor.  A particularly compelling measure of its worth is that the work in the report has been carried out in an environment of scanty and unreliable data, not to mention a generalised culture of official obfuscation and prevarication. Returning to our more immediate concerns, the APU study’s methodology is available in Chapter 5 of the State of Working India 2021 report, and is discussed, in what follows, with respect to the input data employed in the study. 3.1 The APU Income Distribution Input (D) The distributional data employed in the study are drawn from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy-Consumer Pyramid Household Surveys (CMIE-CPHS).  What we earlier referred to as the ‘pre-COVID-19’ and ‘post-COVID-19’ periods correspond, in the APU study, to the eight-month period July 2019-February 2020 and the eight-month period March 2020-October 2020, respectively.  The study accumulates the incomes in each income-class across the eight months in each period, to arrive at a consolidated picture of the ‘pre-COVID-19’ and ‘post-COVID-19’ distributions.  These data are not explicitly presented in the State of Working India report but have been kindly made available to me by the report’s authors upon request.  The relevant data are furnished in Table 6. Table 6: Pre- and Post-COVID-19 Rural and Urban Income Distributions (APU) Related content   Note: G stands for the Gini coefficient of inequality. Source: Data supplied to the present author by the authors of the APU study. Some observations are in order. Surprisingly, (a) the APU estimates of the urban income-Gini in 2020 are slightly lower than the NSO urban consumption-Gini in 2011-12; and (b) there is only a minor suggestion of worsening of inequality from before to after COVID-19, in both rural and urban India. 9   Secondly, and as noted by the authors of the APU report, the earnings data in the CMIE-CPHS are substantially larger than those reported by the Periodic Labour Force Employment-Unemployment Survey of 2018-19.  This issue will be briefly revisited later in this article. 3.2 The APU Poverty Line Input Data (z) The basis for the poverty lines employed in the APU study is explained thus in their report (APU, 2021: p.16): The Expert Committee on Determining the Methodology for fixing the National Minimum Wage (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2019) proposed a wage such that the expenditure on minimum recommended food intake, essential non-food items (namely clothing, fuel and light, house rent, education, medical, footwear, and transport) and other non-food items for the wage earner and their dependents can be met. The recommendation was ₹375 per day (₹104 per capita per day) for rural areas and ₹430 (₹119 per capita per day) for urban areas as of July 2018 10 . This works out to ₹2,900 per capita per month and ₹3,344 per capita per month respectively, after adjusting for inflation in Jan 2020 terms. The poverty line input data are summarised in Table 7.  Table 7: Rural and Urban Poverty Lines per Person per Month (in ₹) in 2020 at Current Prices (APU) Rural Poverty Line Urban Poverty Line 2,900 3,344 Source: APU (2021) Table 8, which combines data from Tables 2 and 7 shows that the APU rural and urban poverty lines are twice as large as the ones in the PRC study. This is a major source of deviation in the assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on poverty in India and calls for some discussion.   Table 8: Rural and Urban Poverty Lines per Person per Month (in ₹) in 2020 at Current Prices (PRC and APU) Rural Poverty Line (in ₹) Urban Poverty Line (in ₹) PRC APU PRC ACU 1,478 2,900 1,514­­­­­­­ 3,344 Source: From Tables 2 and 7. 3.2.1 A pragmatic assessment of the poverty norm India’s official poverty lines are derived on the basis of that level of consumer expenditure at which some stipulated calorific norm of food consumption is found to be achieved in some reference year, and the reference year poverty line is then ‘updated’ for other years by means of a consumer price index to reflect price changes.  The World Bank’s ‘dollar-a-day’ type poverty lines are based on the poverty lines of some of the income-poorest countries of the world many of which were prescribed by the World Bank itself. Neither approach is based on any explicit accounting of commodity requirements (and their costing) for achieving a well-defined list of human functionings at levels that might be deemed to just avoid deprivation.  The result is that both official Indian poverty lines and the World Bank’s international poverty line have tended to understate the poverty threshold, by failing to provide a basis for these lines’ adequacy in the matter of meeting a set of basic needs in a measure that could be construed as necessary to escape poverty.  The serious limitations of working with the World Bank’s international poverty line have been discussed by other commentators, including Reddy and Pogge (2010) and Reddy and Lahoti (2015), and will not be repeated here. Both official Indian poverty lines and the World Bank’s international poverty line have tended to understate the poverty threshold. What is suggestive is that often a combination of practical knowledge and common sense is a more reliable guide to identifying the poverty line than methods which involve plotting graphs and reading off threshold levels, or squinting at scatter diagrams of some of the poorest countries’ poverty thresholds.  Most of us who are familiar with the environments in which we live must be expected to have a reasonably accurate idea of the income required to achieve some minimally acceptable standard of living. In the spirit of pragmatism just alluded to, Jayaraj and Subramanian (2017) have made an attempt to derive a poverty line for urban Tamil Nadu for the year 2014-15.  In doing so, they consider both food and non-food necessities.  Based on nutrient requirements and recommended dietary allowances for Indians as advanced by the Indian Council of Medical Research (2010) with reference to a low-cost ‘Indian vegetarian balanced diet’, the authors cost the items that might be expected to constitute the diet in question, while also taking account of the subsidiary ingredients that would typically enter a Tamil vegetarian diet of the type under consideration. In the matter of non-food requirements, they make essentially conservative estimates of what it would cost to achieve some elementary standard of living with respect to shelter, education, energy needs, healthcare, transport and communication, clothing and footwear, entertainment and socialization, and personal hygiene.  The costing is done on a monthly basis for a family of five, and the poverty line which the authors come up with amounts to ₹14,000 for such a family, which most urban residents of India would view, from personal experience and practical knowledge, as a by no means unreasonable figure. On a per capita basis, the poverty line is a monthly income of ₹2,800—considerably higher than, for instance, the Rangarajan Committee’s recommended urban poverty line which, at 2014-15 prices, would be of the order of just ₹1,600.  The poverty line suggested here is admittedly a rough-and-ready one, but it probably relates to what we know about poverty better than one assiduously derived from employing slide-rule-and-compass, which however bears little obvious relation to poverty as we might be expected to understand that condition. Continuing in this vein of uniform simple-mindedness, one could advance the cause of a poverty line (at 2014-15 prices) of ₹2,800 per person per month for urban India, and one for rural India of ₹2,240, which is 80 per cent of the urban poverty line: a swift (and brutal) concession to lower rural prices. Employing the CPIAL and CPIIW prices indices, the rural and urban poverty lines at 2020 prices are of the order of ₹2,839 per person per month for rural India, and ₹3,597 for urban India. These numbers are not far from the rural and urban poverty lines—₹2,900 and ₹3344 respectively—used in the APU study. The APU poverty lines surely appear to reflect a substantially more acceptable standard of what constitutes deprivation thresholds than the World Bank line adopted in the APU study (even allowing for the qualifier of ‘extreme’ for the poverty implied by the World Bank line). 3.3 The Mean Income Input (m) The APU study’s mean income estimates are based on a periodisation of pre- and post-COVID-19 India in two eight-month stretches—July 2019-February 2020 and March 2020-October 2020 respectively. The mean income for the pre-COVID-19 period is taken to be the average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly incomes from July 2019 to February 2020, and that for the post-COVID-19 period to be the average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly incomes from March 2020 to December 2020. The authors of the report state (APU, 2021: p.11): The seasonally-adjusted cumulative income in the months of March to October was 22 per cent less compared [with] the preceding eight months of July 2019 to February 2020. The cumulative decline was higher in urban areas than rural areas (26 per cent versus 21 per cent). For an average household in urban areas this amounts to losing 2.1 months of income (about ₹64,000 for a family of four) and in rural areas losing 1.7 months of income (about ₹34,000 for a family of four). From the quoted paragraph, one can infer 11 the magnitudes of the per capita monthly average income in the pre- and post-COVID-19 periods, for each of the rural and urban areas, and these are summarised in Table 9. Table 9: Pre- and Post-Covid Rural and Urban Average Incomes (in ₹) in 2020 at Current Prices (APU) Pre-COVID-19 Rural Mean Post-COVID-19 Rural Mean Pre-COVID-19 Urban Mean Post-COVID-19 Urban Mean 5,060 3,997 7,692 5,692   Source: Based on APU (2021), as explained in the text. It is possible, as stated in Section 3.1, that the CMIE-CPHS estimates of income on which the APU study’s estimates are based are uniformly exaggerated versions of the corresponding actual incomes—arising possibly from under-sampling of the poorest classes (see Dreze and Somanchi, 2021). However, the declines in average incomes on account of the pandemic appear to be realistic in relation to what one knows about the differential impacts of the pandemic and the lockdown on rural and urban livelihoods in the context of employment and earnings.  The APU estimate points to a substantial difference between declines in average urban and rural incomes.  The decline in average urban income, at 26 per cent, is higher than the decline in average rural income, at 21 per cent.  In contrast, the PRC study suggests a single, undifferentiated, and much lower reduction in average income of 14.6 per cent for both the rural and the urban areas (see Table 3).  In view of this, and in view of the restricted choices available, there is a case for favouring the APU study-based estimates in Table 9.  The case against what one might call uniform 'data-nihilism' is also made by Dhingra and Ghatak (2021) when they say: 'Despite [certain] statistical concerns, the CPHS does provide consumption numbers for a large sample of individuals, which can provide insights into changes in consumption levels arising from the pandemic.'     3.4 Results from the APU Input Data Table 10 summarises the reconstructed APU input data on distributions, poverty lines and mean incomes. Table 10: Summary of APU Study’s Reconstructed Input Data on Distributions, Poverty Lines and Means: 2020 Related content   Source: Based on the numbers in Tables 7 and 9. Table 11, following, presents the POVCALNET results on headcount ratios, aggregate headcounts, and changes in these, for the input data on distributions, poverty lines and mean incomes attributed to the APU study. (As earlier, we take India’s 2020 population to be 1,360 million, with shares of 65 per cent and 35 per cent for the rural and urban areas respectively.) Table 11, relating to the ‘APU results’, corresponds to Table 5, which is a summary of the ‘PRC results’. Table 11: Levels and Changes in Headcount Ratios and Aggregate Headcounts Attributable to Covid-19, using the APU Study’s Reconstructed Input Data   Rural Pre- COVID-19 Rural Post-COVID-19 Rural Change Urban Pre-COVID-19 Urban Post-COVID-19 Urban Change Total Change Headcount Ratio .2646 .4187 .1541 .1631 .3391 .1760 .1618 Aggregate Headcount (in millions) 233.91 370.13 136.22 77.64 161.41 83.77 219.99 Source: Author's calculations based on the input data summarised in Table 10. The reconstructed APU data are compatible with an estimate of an increased aggregate poverty headcount, attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, of 220 million—which falls short of the   APU study’s estimate of 230 million, but not by much: the one estimate is nearly 96 per cent of the other.  Return to Contents IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRC AND APU ESTIMATES Now, let us consider the incremental numbers of people pushed into poverty as a consequence of the pandemic and the accompanying lockdown.  The APU estimate of this incremental number, at 230 million people, exceeds the PRC incremental estimate, at 75 million people, by a factor of 3! From what we know of the differential impacts of the pandemic-and-lockdown combination of events on rural and urban areas, it was the latter that were most severely affected.  This is reflected in the reconstructed APU estimate which suggests that the incremental aggregate urban headcount (84 million) is about 38 per cent of the overall increase (220 million). The PRC estimate, on the other hand, suggests that the urban areas, with an additional (roughly) 8 million in poverty, account for less than 11 per cent of the overall change (76 million). This is not the only reason for judging the APU estimate as being vastly more plausible than the PRC estimate, as can be seen from the detailed evidence presented in the APU report on unemployment, job losses, losses in earnings, increased levels of hunger in the aftermath of the covid-inspired lockdown, and the extremely poor policy responses to these events of distress. In terms of the impact of the input data employed on the resulting outputs, it would appear that the distributions employed in the two studies were least instrumental in explaining the differing estimates of the two studies; differences in the mean incomes data employed by the two studies have greater explanatory significance; and differing assumptions about the poverty lines the greatest influence. Thus, if we preserve the APU data inputs on mean incomes and poverty lines but vary only the distributions by switching to those employed in the PRC study, we find that the resulting estimate of the change is 233 million: if anything, changing the distribution causes the estimate of the incremental change to increase , but not by much. If we preserve the APU data inputs on distributions and poverty lines but replace the APU mean incomes by the PRC mean incomes, we find a more substantial deviation in the change: it declines from 220 million to 147 million. Finally, if we preserve the APU data inputs on distributions and mean incomes but switch from the APU poverty lines to the PRC poverty lines, we discover a massive fall in the estimate: from 220 million to just 76 million. Our reservations on the widespread use of the World Bank’s international poverty line would seem to be well-founded: in the instant case, as in a general way, it is misleading to employ unrealistically low poverty lines, even when qualified by the notion of conveying a sense of ‘extreme’ poverty.  Return to Contents V. CONCLUDING NOTE Everything considered, a count of upwards of 200 million additional people plunged into poverty, as estimated by the APU study, seems eminently plausible. We are speaking only of the first wave of the pandemic which, by all accounts, was less devastating than the second wave. The outcome, even when confined to a partial assessment of the impact on poverty, has been grievously harsh, accompanied, as it has been, by aspects of government policy that have been a combination of misplaced over-zealousness in the matter of implementing an abrupt, draconian lockdown and immutable reluctance in the matter of affording relief to the country’s affected citizens. A count of upwards of 200 million additional people plunged into poverty, as estimated by the APU study, seems eminently plausible. In this context, it is striking (even allowing for ‘adaptive expectations’) that we have not, apparently, had any state-sponsored attempt at providing or seeking evidence on the impact of COVID-19 on poverty. This is the more striking in the face of generalized and intense global awareness of, and concern with, the likely devastating consequences of the pandemic for national and international economic outcomes. Such engagement is easily seen in the research and opinion put out by various multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and UNICEF, think-tanks like UNU-WIDER, professional journals like The Economist , and individual researchers. A small and illustrative list of studies on poverty and the pandemic would include: Kharas (2020), Kharas and Dooley (2021), Sumner et al (2020), Lakner et al (2021), IMF (2020), UNICEF (2020) (which contains both global and country-level studies on the impact of COVID-19 on child poverty in Africa, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbeans, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific), and several articles in The Economist (including in the issues of May 23, 2020; September 26, 2020; October 23, 2020; April 10, 2021; and May 15, 2021). The evidence on the impact of COVID-19 on living standards can be only as sound as the data on which it is based. But what evidence there is, combined with informed general awareness and the application of common sense, suggests both the need for and the possibility of well-founded policy intervention. This is a major reason why the available evidence needs to be appraised, systematised, and repeatedly put out in the public domain. Hence also this essay, however forlorn might be the hope that inspires it.        Acknowledgement: The author is indebted to Amit Basole and Rahul Lahoti for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay . Return to Contents   Also by the Author 1. Letting the Data Speak: Consumption Spending, Rural Distress, Urban Slow-Down, and Overall Stagnation, Dec. 11, 2019. 2. Some Basic Issues Underlying Basic Income, Feb. 7, 2019. 3. Some Views on Public Policy Outcomes in India - Is it the Message or the Messenger?, Nov. 12, 2018.   [ S. Subramanian is a retired professor of Economics from the Madras Institute of Development Studies, and a former Indian Council of Social Science Research National Fellow. He has research interests in the fields of poverty, inequality, demography, welfare economics, social choice theory, and development economics. He is an elected Fellow of the Human Development and Capabilities Association, and was a member of the advisory board of the World Bank’s Commission on Global Poverty (2015-16). He is the author of, among other books, The Poverty Line (Oxford University Press: 2012), Inequality and Poverty: A Short Critical Introduction (Springer: 2019), and Futilitarianism (Routledge, Delhi: 2020). He can be contacted at [email protected] ].   Endnotes: 1. For a sample illustration, see the POVCALNET web-page titled ‘ Estimate Your Own Distribution’ , The World Bank here: [http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/PovCalculator.aspx]. Return To text. 2. Just for completeness of record, here is how the input data are converted into the corresponding output results. (This methodological summary can be ignored by the general reader without any significant loss in the narrative of this Issue Brief.) The distributional data, D , are essentially in the form of distinguished ordinates of the Lorenz curve , and there is a software programme which uses these data to estimate the equation of the Lorenz curve; once that is done, it is a simple matter to derive the value of the Gini coefficient of inequality, which is just twice the area enclosed by the Lorenz curve and the diagonal of the unit square in which the curve is plotted. As for the headcount ratio, the software programme exploits the fact that the slope of the Lorenz curve at any point corresponding  to an income level of x is just x/m , where m , to recall, is mean income; so the headcount ratio of poverty can be inferred as that value on the Lorenz curve’s horizontal axis at which the slope of the Lorenz curve (computable from the already derived equation of the Lorenz curve) is equal to z/m , z being, of course, the poverty line. The POVCALNET software resorts to two estimating equations of the Lorenz curve—the so-called General Quadratic Lorenz and the Beta Lorenz. All estimates in this note are based on the relevant General Quadratic Lorenz's. Return to Text. 3. Household consumption expenditure is “the sum total of monetary values of all the items (i.e. goods and services) consumed by the household on domestic account during the reference period.” Expenses that are actually made only on consumption are included, and therefore, imputed expenses, such as rents of owner-occupied houses, or expenses incurred on productive enterprises are excluded. (Summarised from ‘ India - Household Consumer Expenditure, Type 1 : July 2011 - June 2012, NSS 68th Round ’, Technical Documents, Concepts and Definitions, P A-11.) [http://microdata.gov.in/nada43/index.php/catalog/1/related_materials]. Return to Text. 4. The URP method refers to consumption data collected by asking "people about their consumption expenditure across a 30-day recall period" Under MRP, "data on five less-frequently used items are collected over a one-year period, while sticking to the 30-day recall for the rest of the items. The low-frequency items include expenditure on health, education, clothing, durables etc." Under MMRP "for some food items, instead of a 30-day recall, only a 7-day recall is collected. Also, for some low-frequency items, instead of a 30-day recall, a 1-year recall is collected. This is believed to provide a more accurate reflection of consumption expenditures." Misra, U. 2015 . " Meaning URP, MRP, MMRP ", The Indian Express, October 7. [https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/meaning-urp-mrp-mmrp/]. Return to Text. 5. World Bank. 2015 .   Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures of World Economics: A Comprehensive Report of the 2011 International Comparison Program , Washington, DC. © World Bank . [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20526]. License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Return to Text. 6. For data on CPIAL, see https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=13884 for 2011-12, and https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=20342# for April 2020; and for data on CPIIW, see https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=13882 for 2011-12, and https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=18666 for October 2019. Return to Text. 7. Tables 1BR and 1BU of National Sample Survey (2014): Level and Pattern of Consumer Expenditure 201-12 , NSS 68 Round, National Sample Survey Office, MOSPI, GOI, February 2014. Return to Text. 8. The World Bank . nd . GDP per capita (constant LCU) – India . [https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KN?locations=IN]. Return to Text. 9. Note: However, in both cases, for each cumulated decile of the population, the cumulated income share in the pre-COVID-19 period is greater than or equal to the corresponding cumulated income share, post-COVID-19, reflecting a case of what in the technical literature is called 'Lorenz dominance'.  Return to Text. 10. I take it that the recommended daily rural and urban allowances of ₹375 and ₹430, respectively, are for a household of four, so that the daily per capita allowances become ₹93.75 (or ₹2,812.50 per month) and ₹107.50 (or ₹3,225 per month) at 2018 prices. The reported daily allowances of ₹104 and ₹119 translate to monthly levels of ₹3,120 and ₹3,570 respectively at 2018 prices, in excess the poverty lines for 2020 specified in the Report. One suspects there is an error in reporting the daily per capita allowances. Return to Text. 11. For example, for the rural areas, a 21 per cent loss of ₹34,000 suggests pre-and post-COVID-19 incomes of ₹161,905 (= 34000/.21) and ₹127,905 (= 161,905 – 34,000); on a per capita basis, given a family of four, this works out to ₹40,476 and ₹31,976 respectively; averaging out over eight months, yields per capita monthly means for the pre- and post-COVID-19 periods of ₹5,060 and ₹3,997 respectively. Similar computations can be made for urban areas. Return to Text.   References: [ All URLs were last accessed on August 17, 2021. ] Azim Premji University. 2021. State of Working India 2021: One year of Covid-19 , Centre for Sustainable Employment. [https://cse.azimpremjiuniversity.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/State_of_Working_India_2021-One_year_of_Covid-19.pdf]. Dhingra, S. and Ghatak, M. 2021. ‘ How has Covid-19 affected India’s economy? ’, Economics Observatory . [https://www.economicsobservatory.com/how-has-covid-19-affected-indias-economy]. Dreze, J. and Somanchi, A. 2021. ‘ The Covid-19 Crisis and People’s Right to Food ’, SocArXiv. June 1. doi:10.31235/osf.io/ybrmg. [https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/ybrmg/]. Indian Council of Medical Research. 2010. Nutrient Requirements and Recommended Dietary Allowance for Indians: A Report of the Expert Group of the Indian Council of Medical Research 2010 , National Institute of Nutrition, Hyderabad, India. [https://www.enacnetwork.com/files/pdf/ICMR_RDA_BOOK_2010.pdf]. International Monetary Fund. 2020 . ‘ A Crisis Like No Other, An Uncertain Recovery ’, World Economic Outlook Update, June 2020. [https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020]. Jayaraj, D. and Subramanian, S. 2017. ‘The Iniquity of Money-Metric Poverty in India’, Basic Income Studies , 12 (1): pp. 1 – 26. Kharas, H. 2020. ‘ The Impact of Covid-19 on Global Extreme Poverty ’, Brookings , October 21.  [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/10/21/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-global-extreme-poverty/]. Kharas, H. and M. Dooley, M. 2021. ‘ Long-Run Impacts of Covid-19 on Extreme Poverty ’, Brookings , June 2.  [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2021/06/02/long-run-impacts-of-covid-19-on-extreme-poverty/]. Kochhar, R. 2021. ‘ In the pandemic, India’s middle class shrinks and poverty spreads while  China sees smaller changes ’, Pew Research Centre , March 18. [https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/03/18/in-the-pandemic-indias-middle-class-shrinks-and-poverty-spreads-while-china-sees-smaller-changes/]. Lakner, C., Yonzan, N., et. al. 2021. ‘ Updated Estimates of the Impact of Covid-19 on Global Poverty: Looking Back at 2020 and the Outlook for 2021 ’,  World Bank Blogs, January 11. [https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-global-poverty-looking-back-2020-and-outlook-2021]. (An updated analysis by the same authors is available at ‘ Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Turning the corner on the pandemic in 2021? ’, World Bank Blogs, June 24.) [https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updated-estimates-impact-covid-19-global-poverty-turning-corner-pandemic-2021]. Ministry of Labour and Employment. 2019. Report of the Expert Committee on Determining the Methodology for Fixing the National Minimum Wage , Government of India. [https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/Commitee_on_Determination_of_Methodology.pdf]. Reddy, S.  and Lahoti, R. 2016. ‘$1.9 a Day: What Does it Say?’ New Left Review , Jan-Feb 2016, 97: 106-127.  Reddy, S. and Pogge, T. 2010. ‘How Not to Count the Poor,’ in S. Anand, P. Segal and J. Stiglitz (eds): Debates on the Measurement of Global Poverty, Oxford University Press: New York. Sumner, A., Hoy, C., et. al. 2020. ‘ Estimates of the Impact of Covid-19 on Global Poverty ’, WIDER Working Paper No. 2020/43, April. [https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2020-43.pdf]. UNICEF. nd. Covid-19 Impacts on Child Poverty: Social Policy Analysis to Inform the Covid-19 Response .  [https://www.unicef.org/social-policy/child-poverty/covid-19-socioeconomic-impacts].

In the space of two weeks in July, two decisions   resurrected the policy focus on cooperatives in India.  The first, by the executive, was to constitute an independent Union Ministry of Cooperation (MoC). The second, by the judiciary, was a verdict of the Supreme Court of India declaring that cooperative societies as a subject matter belong "wholly and exclusively to the State legislatures to legislate upon". In this Issue Brief,  H.S. Shylendra, Professor, Social Science Area, Institute of Rural Management (IRMA),  Anand,  draws out the legal and constitutional implications of these two developments, presents the relevance of a cooperative-based economy, and identifies the pathways for its success in the light of India’s experience with cooperatives and the prevailing political economy. The best prescription, he concludes, would be a movement, more than a ministry, to support India’s ailing cooperative sector proactively in diverse ways without hurting its autonomy. HTML version [PDF 326 KB]

In the space of two weeks in July, two decisions resurrected the policy focus on cooperatives in India.  The first, by the executive, was to constitute an independent Union Ministry of Cooperation (MoC). The second, by the judiciary, was a verdict of the Supreme Court of India declaring that cooperative societies as a subject matter belong "wholly and exclusively to the State legislatures to legislate upon". In this Issue Brief, H.S. Shylendra, Professor, Social Science Area, Institute of Rural Management (IRMA),  Anand, draws out the legal and constitutional implications of these two developments, presents the relevance of a cooperative-based economy, and identifies the pathways for its success in the light of India’s experience with cooperatives and the prevailing political economy. The best prescription, he concludes, would be a movement, more than a ministry, to support India’s ailing cooperative sector proactively in diverse ways without hurting its  autonomy. CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. BRIEF HISTORY LEADING TO A MINISTRY III. 'EMBRACE-OF-DEATH' TO REFORMS IV. BUILDING A COOPERATIVE-BASED ECONOMY V. PATHWAYS TO COOPERATIVE SUCCESS   I. INTRODUCTION Two recent developments have brought the policy focus back on India's cooperatives.  The first is the decision of the Government of India (GoI) on July 6, 2021, to constitute an independent Union Ministry of Cooperation (MoC) and the second is the judgement of the Supreme Court of India delivered on July 20, 2021, declaring  that "Co-operative societies as a subject matter belongs wholly and exclusively to the State legislatures to legislate upon..." 1  Coming as they did from different sources, these two decisions have clear consequences on each other. The creation of the MoC has raised hackles over the real intention of the Union government as it is perceived to open out space for the centre to interfere in the working of the cooperatives that are under the jurisdiction of State governments.  The Supreme Court judgement on a writ appeal on the 97 th Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) clarifies the constitutional position on the domain over cooperatives and by virtue of that gives credence to the concerns of the States over possible meddling by centre in their domain, 2 be it through amendments to the law or by creating a Ministry.    The newly established MoC has also raised a debate over the potential role such a Ministry can play in promoting the cooperative sector given the current socio-economic milieu. The Government of India on its part has called the step an 'historic move' that will strengthen cooperatives as a true peoples’-based movement. The government in its press note 3 has emphasised that a 'Co-operative based economic development model is very relevant....' and the Ministry through its 'administrative, legal and policy framework' will streamline the processes of 'Ease-of-doing-business for cooperatives.' Thus, apparently, the Ministry has set a larger goal for itself of working towards a cooperative-based-economy through a multi-pronged strategy. Those supportive of the new idea feel that it can help bring about uniform development of the cooperative movement in the country given its uneven spread 4 and address the much-needed inter-State coordination in the working of cooperatives 5 .  However, sceptics are clear that in addition to compromising on the norms of federalism, the Ministry may work more as a front for dispensing political patronage 6 .  Given such mixed concerns, it would be worthwhile to examine critically not only the legal position of such a Union Ministry but also the larger issue of promoting a cooperative-based-economy. Return to Contents II. BRIEF HISTORY LEADING TO A MINISTRY In the constitutional scheme of things, a clear demarcation has been drawn regarding cooperatives by placing them in the State List (List II of Seventh Schedule).  The States have exclusive powers to legislate on and govern the cooperatives registered within their boundaries.  Although the first cooperative societies act passed in 1904 under the colonial rule (and amended in 1912) was a central act, the 1919 administrative reforms transferred cooperatives to the provinces (GoI 2005) 7 .  Since then Provinces and, after Independence, States have taken over the subject of cooperatives and have framed their own Acts to regulate cooperatives. In the meanwhile, the Multi-Unit Co-Operative Societies Act, 1942, was passed by the Government of India in 1942 (re-enacted in 1984 and 2002) giving the Union government jurisdiction over multi-State cooperatives.  Overall, since the first Act of 1904, there has been a fair amount of clarity about the jurisdiction of the Union and the State governments over cooperatives, although the Reserve Bank of India as a federal level monetary authority could exercise some powers over the cooperative banks especially in the interest of the depositors as per the Banking Regulation Act 8 . Having been assigned primacy over cooperative governance, State governments created a separate ministry or department of cooperation for administering the cooperatives.  Given the importance of this sector, State-level cooperative Ministries have also enjoyed a fair amount power and autonomy. The Government of India on its part has been working with cooperatives mainly through a minor department created as a part of some major Ministry to discharge its responsibilities pertaining to multi-state cooperatives and the general development of cooperatives in the country through various developmental schemes. Since 1904, there has been clarity about the jurisdiction of the Union and the State governments. The developmental role pursued by the Union government includes promotion of cooperatives, provision of financial assistance, capacity building through training of members and staff, infrastructure and technology development, and revival plans. Such schemes, framed under the Five Year Plans, were implemented through the concurrence of the respective State’s cooperative ministry or department. Given this two-fold role, over the years the cooperative department has been attached to or placed with diverse Union ministries such as food and civil supplies or community development or commerce or agriculture. Such linkages with a multiplicity of Ministries underscore the broader scope of the cooperative sector, combining both agriculture and non-agricultural cooperatives.   Given that agriculture has been the prominent sector for cooperatives, since 1979 the Department of Cooperation has been attached to the Union agricultural ministry.  Until the creation of the new MoC, issues pertaining to cooperatives were overseen by a division within the Department of agriculture, cooperation and farmers’ welfare coming under a larger ministry for agriculture 9 . Hence, the sudden up-gradation of a division/department with a relatively limited role into a full-fledged Union Ministry is a curious development, triggering concerns. An argument being put-forth is that the cooperative division in the agricultural department was unable to look after adequately the cooperatives, more so with regard to such entities operating in the non-agricultural sector which in the recent days constitute a significant proportion 10 . However, even if the non-agricultural cooperatives have grown in numbers, a bulk of them are working under the jurisdiction of State governments (see Table 1). Such an argument, hence, may not be fully tenable. Explicating New Delhi’s rationale for such a step and clarifying the concerns of the cooperative stakeholders would require going beyond the mere legal or administrative angle. Such an explanation is attempted in the following section which highlights the issues connected with the larger politics and governance about the cooperatives, and the likely compulsions that may have arisen in the sector in context of the economic reforms.                                       Table 1:  Sector-wise Distribution of Cooperatives  in India (%, 2016-17)  Sector % (Total in numbers)   Credit & Thrift 20.79 Housing 17.83 Dairy 17.79 Labour 5.50 Agri-Allied & Livestock 3.50 Consumer 3.08 Women/Tribal/SC&ST 2.52 Textile & Handloom 2.05 Industrial 2.03 Multi-Purpose 1.75 Others 23.02 Multi-State Coops 0.15 Total Cooperatives  (number) 8,54,355   Source:  National Cooperative Union of India (NCUI), 2018 .  Return to Contents III. 'EMBRACE-OF-DEATH' TO REFORMS India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who wanted to 'convulse India with Co-operation' was equally emphatic that government control over cooperatives is like an 'embrace-of-death' (as quoted in Dwivedi 1989). 11 Cooperatives, which are democratic institutions by form, have been treated as potential training grounds for developing and nurturing grassroots leaders who can then move into the larger political domain.  Given the competitive politics over the decades, this double-edged intention, howsoever noble, unfortunately has degenerated into a wily strategy of political parties and leaders to capture cooperatives to advance their own prospects in the guise of cooperative development. The sector has emerged as an avenue for dispensing patronage to the supporters of ruling parties. Ruling parties and the governments have openly made use of such opportunities to seize positions or suspend the committees of opposing groups or appoint bureaucrats to run the cooperatives under the tutelage of a government department (GoI 2009) 12 (Jain and Coelho 1996) 13 .  No doubt in several places, irrespective of political opportunities which were there for the taking at local or regional levels, many leaders have worked more broadmindedly and in a neutral manner to develop cooperatives as successful ventures for the benefit of the wider section of the membership. Given the developmental role assigned to cooperatives under the planning process and the resources deployed for the purpose, the cooperatives sector has emerged as an avenue for dispensing patronage to the supporters of ruling parties, either by way of nomination to the governing boards or sanctioning schemes specific or common to the cooperatives. The policy of contributing to the share capital of the cooperatives and providing various financial assistance like loan and guarantees have enabled State governments, in the name of public interest, to directly intervene in the working of cooperatives which are legally autonomous.  The role of the State governments has only worked to the detriment of the cooperative movement in general despite leading to some localised successes (Baviskar and Attwood 1991) 14 . Such a top-down approach deprived the cooperatives of their vitality in meeting the needs of their members and losing credibility in the process.  The prevailing social-economic inequalities as reflected in illiteracy, poverty, and caste-differences also had not helped the cause of the cooperatives.  Horace Plunkett, the pioneer of Irish cooperatives, had aptly observed: 'there is no cooperative movement in India, there is only the cooperative policy of government' 15 . The poor outcomes of the state-driven interference in the cooperative movement and the emerging realities in the post-reforms era resulted in some serious policy level introspections about the cooperatives. Given also their structural constraints related to scale of operations and ability to access capital, cooperatives had struggled to thrive in the liberalised economy despite growing in physical numbers (see Table 2). For example, the share of credit cooperatives in the ground level credit disbursed which was 62 per cent in 1992-93 plummeted to 34 per cent in 2002-03 16 .                                                     Table 2: Progress of Cooperatives        Indicator 1950-51 17 1991-92 2016-17 Total Number  181190 318700 854355 Total Members (Million) 13.7 148.0 290.1 % of members to total population 3.8 % 17.5% 22.2% Source:  NCUI, 2018. Although the cooperative sector had shown some hesitancy to accept economic reforms, the emerging realities forced them and the government to evolve relevant strategies to face up to the challenge. Simultaneously, there were strident calls to give autonomy to cooperatives to function more independently and to respond adequately to the signals of a market-economy. Reforming cooperatives assumed greater importance under the ongoing economic liberalisation. Some of the reforms initiated included opening-up the dairy sector to players other than cooperatives, application of prudential norms to cooperative banks, and enactment of liberal cooperative Acts by the States. Many civil society organisations had already started organising collectives outside the cooperative laws in the form of trust or societies to avoid state control. There were also efforts to form informal cooperatives and self-help groups (SHGs) under the growing influence of the design-principles based on institutional economics (Agarwal 2010). 18 Many cooperative leaders wanted more liberal cooperative laws. This came in the form of the enactment of the mutually aided cooperative society Acts starting from 1995 onwards  by seven State governments.  Andhra Pradesh was the pioneer which had passed The Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act, 1995, considered as a path-breaking law. These new liberal laws encouraged formation of cooperatives delinked from the government patronage and control. The second major legal measure was the amendment in 2002 to the Companies Act of 1956, to create a new kind of cooperatives called Producers’ Companies’ (PCs) as hybrid organisations combining the strengths of cooperatives and the corporate entities.  At the same time, given the growing prominence of multi-state cooperatives in terms of their number and business, the Union government came up with a more enabling legislation called the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act in 2004, replacing the 1984 Act 19 . The next major step in the direction was the enactment of the 97 th CAA in 2012, which conferred a fundamental right on formation of a cooperative, and introduced, to quote from the Statement and Objects of the Bill, "fundamental reforms to revitalize these institutions in order to ensure their contribution in the economic development of the country and to serve the interests of members and public at large and also to ensure their autonomy, democratic functioning and professional management." 20 A major reason attributed by the Union government to justify the CAA was that despite incentivising institutional and legal reforms through cooperative revival schemes, State governments were not forthcoming proactively to change the legal framework because of their own compulsions (GoI 2009) 21 .  State governments, hence, were to be compelled to change their laws in tune with uniform constitutional norms. Incidentally, it is these uniform provisions of the 97 th CAA which the Supreme Court has struck down in its judgement of July 20, 2021, in their application to States whose concurrence was  not taken for the same.  It is now left to the State governments to decide whether they would like to retain or not the amendments made in their cooperative Acts pursuant to  the 97 th CAA.    Thus, both the Union and the States have made several attempts in the post-reforms period to restructure the cooperative legal framework with mixed outcomes.  The former, particularly, has taken legal and constitutional measures to alter the governance scenario despite cooperatives being prominently in the State domain.  In the process, while the centre saw the States as reluctant reformers, it was, in turn, perceived by States as obtruding in the guise of reforms.  This gives a clear perspective as to why the formation of a new MoC is contentious, if not untenable. The State governments, in particular those ruled by opposition parties, are bound to perceive that Union government may have some other plan up its sleeve. Although part of provisions of the 97 th CAA pertaining to State-level cooperatives have been struck down by the Supreme Court, the role of Union government regarding multi-state cooperatives has been clearly recognised. The developmental role of the centre continues to be relevant even as the legal forms of cooperatives have been getting diversified.  In addition, more women are coming forward to be part of the cooperative movement. The centre, no-doubt, has a prerogative to restructure its administrative framework to streamline its activities. The formation of the MoC is legally and constitutionally tenable even though the up-gradation looks disproportionate to the current level of engagement of the Union government with the cooperative sector. However, it may want to play a bigger role proactively going beyond the current mandate given the potential that the cooperative sector holds for building political constituencies.  According to a newspaper report, the centre  may even explore amending the Constitution to add cooperatives in the Concurrent List to enhance its mandate more legitimately 22 . The press note issued about the MoC, however, does not clarify many of these issues except identifying some hazier goals including talking about the relevance of cooperative-based economic development. Given the common interests that are at play, the Union Government’s apparent keenness to play a larger role in the cooperative sector can become relevant provided it can come out clearly with its plan and seek the cooperation of the States. In India's federal structure, establishing partnership with the States becomes necessary for this new Union Ministry to work towards building a cooperative-based economy that it has visualised.  Return to Contents IV. BUILDING A COOPERATIVE-BASED ECONOMY The real challenge of building a cooperative-based economy, however, lies in making cooperatives thrive on a wider basis, assuming that the Union and the States would be working together for such a cause. The more pertinent question, however, is: How to build a cooperative-based economy in a system which is moving towards strong capitalism? A cooperative-based economy could be defined as one where all major economic activities are prominently carried out by cooperatives and that cooperative way of life is the norm in the society. An overbearing state did not help as cooperatives lost autonomy and got excessively politicised.      India’s efforts under the Five Year Plans in the post-independence period hold some lessons here. The planning era started with the goal of creating 'Cooperative Socialism' with the thrust being on 'cooperativising the rural economy' along Gandhian lines. The state had adopted a proactive approach to support cooperatives through various means. Given the fact that the economy was in a nascent stage of development, cooperatives were able to make some dent in sectors such as credit, milk, sugar, and fertilizers.  The policy of favouring cooperatives in some of these sectors helped them grow significantly. Cooperatives in the dairy and sugar sectors succeeded to a considerable extent due to adoption of integrated models, which helped control the value chain and ensure member loyalty through assured price and services (Attwood and Baviskar 1988) 23 (Shah 1996). 24 However, despite some pockets of success, cooperativisation could not go the desired extent.  As identified earlier, the overbearing nature of the state did not help the cause either as the field not only lost autonomy but got excessively politicised as well. Moreover cooperatives, in general, suffered from other factors that have a bearing on their sustainability, such as constraints in achieving scale, lack of professional support and lack of adequate capital. Inter-group conflicts and domination by local elite were also found to be common among cooperatives.        The arrival of reforms in the 1990s only exacerbated the inherent challenges. Private enterprises entered sectors such as dairy, sugar, and credit that were earlier dominated by cooperatives. Having lost some of their advantages and in the absence of any level playing field, cooperatives faltered despite growing in numbers. Resilient cooperatives and those operating in certain sectors such as fertilisers, milk, sugar, and textiles managed to retain some significant share (Table 3), albeit dwindling over the years 25 .  Much of the market share in all the sectors currently is held by entities other than cooperative enterprises.  Cooperatives overall play only a minor role in economies like India. A global survey conducted for the United Nations in 2014 (Dave Grace & Associates 2014) 26 revealed that cooperatives’ gross revenue to GDP in Asia was 3.25 per cent as against 7.08 per cent for Europe and 4.12 per cent for North America.   Table 3: Sector Specific Share (%) of Cooperatives (2016-17)   Sectors  % Agri-Credit 13.4 Fertilizer Production 28.8 Fertilizer Distribution 35.0 Sugar Produced 30.6 Milk Procurement 17.5 Storage Capacity 14.8 Spindleage 29.3 Direct-Employment 13.3 Source:  NCUI (2018)    Given such a situation, it would be an enormous challenge for cooperatives to regain their position and relevance. The mere slogan ' Sahakar se Samruddhi’' (prosperity from cooperation) of the MoC may not help unless a radical shift takes place in the situation of the cooperatives supported by right kind of ideology and policy stance. As a policy, the announcement of MoC by the present government comes off as one that is more spontaneous like the Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) launched in the wake of the COVID-19-induced economic crisis. Both steps – the formation of the MoC and self-reliant India – are inherently contradictory to the stated policy position and ideological commitments of the main ruling party. The present administration is committed more to globalisation and neoliberal reforms to deepen the capitalist footprints in the country based on private investment and entrepreneurship. A careful reading of the NITI Aayog’s two policy documents viz. 'The Three-Year-Action Agenda:2017-20' (NITI Aayog 2017) 27  and 'Strategy for New India@75' (NITI Aayog 2018) 28   clearly brings out that cooperatives are nowhere in the picture of making India a $4-trillion-economy by 2022-23, as visualised in the strategy. Even in the agricultural sector, where cooperatives have conventionally played a significant role in some of the fields, there is focus mainly on the private investment to promote agribusiness as a way of resolving the agrarian crisis involving a majority of the small and marginal farmers.  One can see only a perfunctory mention of cooperatives or farmers' producer organisations (FPOs) to play a peripheral role.  The cooperatives which had struggled to blossom even in the heydays of planning are bound to shrivel in an era devoid of any ideological heft.  Creation of a new ministry hence sounds rhetorical being not backed up by relevant policy and ideology to make any significant dent.  Return to Contents V. PATHWAYS TO COOPERATIVE SUCCESS Apart from the ideological conviction, real pathways to the success of cooperatives would go with the following strategies. Cooperatives, despite their varied global success, remain relevant from the point of view of human welfare.  Their social and economic relevance has been recognised even in capitalist economies, while they have played a significant role as part of the planning process in socialist economies.  The social significance of cooperatives emerges both due to their intrinsic value and the instrumental role they can play in overcoming the social and economic crises wrought by capitalism. Solidarity among humans has become essential in view of growing challenges like alienation, atomism, inequality, and ecological rift (Ray 2021). 29 The logic of capitalism based on profit-maximisation and accumulation is at the root of many of these crises. As suggested by Marcel Mauss, "[c]ooperative economic organisations guarantee the perpetuation of the future society" (quoted in Nash et.al. 1976,p 3). 30 Economically, cooperatives offer several advantages although they come along with certain inherent limitations. The first advantage is that they enable members with small means to reap the benefits of collective action. In the absence of such a scope, the poor and disadvantaged become highly vulnerable to potentially exploitative market forces. Cooperatives offer bargaining strengths to withstand such vulnerabilities and obtain needy services at cost (Roy 1981). 31 This is the primary reason as to why cooperatives are strongly advocated for the poor (Shylendra 2013). 32 Similarly, for certain perishable commodities or areas crucial for livelihoods such as milk, vegetables, microcredit, and natural resources, cooperatives are seen as the ideal form of business because they enable easier mobilisation of members with scope for scale and cost reduction.  Workers’ cooperatives are another sector of high relevance and advantage. Moreover, given their focus on mutual benefit over profit, cooperatives can help moderate monopolistic tendencies to ensure fair prices and practices. This is one of the primary reasons as to why cooperatives have grown in strength even in capitalist economies. For example, cooperative membership in Europe and North America accounted for 45.6 per cent and 38.6 per cent of the population respectively (Dave Grace & Associates 2014) . Thus, both socially and economically, cooperatives have merits justifying their relevance in any form of economy. Their social and economic relevance has been recognised in capitalist and socialist economies. State and civil society must support cooperatives proactively in diverse ways through suitable law, education, finance, technology, and policies without hurting their autonomy. The best prescription for ‘good governance’ in cooperatives is to promote cooperatives actively without compromising on their basic principles. In addition to such a proactive approach, efforts must be made to help cooperatives overcome some of their structural limitations in attaining the required scale and viability. New ways of organising cooperatives must be necessarily evolved to ensure their economic success.  The inconsiderate aim of forming an independent and formal cooperative for every village or local habitation, irrespective of size, has embedded a structural hindrance to achieve the needed scale for many of the cooperatives.  Hence, many cooperatives at the primary level remained unviable.  Efforts to revive them through amalgamation or capital infusion has been ridden with difficulties given the top-down approach of such polices.   If a cooperative remains unviable, it faces challenges of credibility and sustainability of services.  The primary unit need not necessarily be a stand-alone cooperative  unit always.  In case of size constraint, it should try and function more as a branch of a larger unit to economise. In other words, there can be a multi-village cooperative working as a hub for remote villages having branches.   One related possibility in this direction is careful selection and prioritisation of sectors and areas for cooperative formation.   Although cooperatives may be organised for specific commodities or services, wherever relevant and feasible, multi-purpose cooperatives could be organised to attain viability.  In recent days a cluster-based approach is being advocated, including adoption of 'one-district-one-crop' for FPOs.  However, both may work in a top-down way, resulting in the exclusion of many producers and crops falling outside such a design. The attempt should be to include all potential members needing service in the jurisdiction and overcome viability challenge through innovative design.  Again, the commonly advocated three-tier structure for all cooperative sectors need not be imposed in a top-down way.  A multi-tier cooperative structure may evolve more organically as per its economic need to enable control over the value chain as well as to have clear division of functions at different levels of integration.  Such integration of cooperatives into a multi-tier system must necessarily be promoted on the principle of democratic federalism which respects the mutual autonomy and accountability of each tier.  Legally, cooperatives may assume any form at different levels provided they adhere to basic cooperative norms and are not discriminated by policies because of their legal form. Another crucial area which is often neglected is the professional support for cooperatives to work efficiently in the competitive environment.  Apart from having their own professionals trained for their needs, cooperatives must be enabled to access, in innovative ways, the support of empathetic professionals and technical services through collectives or social enterprises which are organised specifically for such services. Agriculture, which is afflicted by growing fragmentation of operational holdings and ridden with innumerable crises, continues to remain a sector that is ripe for a vibrant revival movement to organise collectives.  The efforts to build a cooperative-based economy can start with agriculture and extend to other sectors logically, as advocated by the late V. Kurien, the founding Chairman of the Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF), which is popular internationally as Amul.   To conclude, a cooperative-based economy is the need of the times and is worthy of serious consideration, more so in the economic and social world which will emerge after COVID-19, which has put enormous pressure on existing business models.  What is required is a more coordinated and planned effort involving various levels so that cooperatives can re-emerge in a bottom-up way to grow into viable and valuable social enterprises.  What India needs is a real movement for cooperatives than the mere creation of a Ministry of Cooperation. Return to Contents   [ H.S. Shylendra is Professor in the Social Science Area, Institute of Rural Management, Anand (IRMA). His areas of interests include Development Theories, Rural development, Gender, Local Governance, and Cooperatives. He has nearly three decades experience combining research, teaching, policy engagement and academic administration. He was a member of the Reserve Bank of India's Expert Committee on Credit Cooperatives. He can be contacted at [email protected] ]. Endnotes: 1. Supreme Court of India. 2021. " Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah ",  p.38, Civil Appeal Nos.9108-9109 of 2014, July 20. [https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2013/21321/21321_2013_32_1501_28728_Judgement_20-Jul-2021.pdf]. Last accessed on August 3, 2021. Return To text. 2. Economic and Political Weekly . 2021.  " A New Ministry for Cooperation " , Vol. 56, Issue. 30, July 24. [https://www.epw.in/journal/2021/30/editorials/new-ministry-cooperation.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D9c8b8f0e47df5cfc4513a1b7d579a36d]. Last accessed on July 27, 2021. Return to Text. 3. Cabinet Secretariat. 2021 . " Modi Government creates a new Ministry of Co-operation ", Posted by PIB Delhi, July 6. [https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1733225]. Last accessed on July 23, 2021. Return to Text. 4. Biswas, P. 2021 . " Explained: Why a Ministry of Cooperation ", The Indian Express , July 15. [https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-why-a-cooperation-ministry-7395784/]. Last accessed on July 23. Return to Text. 5. Gulati,  A . 2021 . " What the new Ministry of Cooperation needs to achieve ",   The Indian Express , July 19. [https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/new-ministry-of-cooperation-agenda-pm-modi-7410968 / ]. Last accessed on July 23, 2021. Return to Text. 6. Rajashekhar, M. 2021 . " Why Exactly Did India Need a Brand New Ministry for Cooperatives, With Amit Shah As Head? ", The Wire , July 11. [https://thewire.in/government/ministry-for-cooperatives-amit-shah-bjp-nda-narendra-modi]. Last accessed on July 23, 2021. Return to Text. 7. Government of India. 2005 . "Report of the Task Force on Revival of Rural Co-operative Credit Institutions", Ministry of Finance, New Delhi. Return to Text. 8. Concerns have been raised over the recent amendments made in 2020 to the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 about the possibility of RBI’s role undermining the autonomy of states with regards to cooperative banks. Return to Text. 9. Government of India . 2020 . "Annual Report: 2019-20", Department of Agriculture, Co-operation, Farmers' Welfare, Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, New Delhi.  Return to Text. 10. Supra Note No 6. Return to Text. 11.  Dwivedi, R.C. 1989 . "Jawaharlal Nehru: His Vision of Cooperatives", The Co-op Times, New Delhi. Return to Text. 12. Government of India . 2009 . "Report of the High Powered Committee on Cooperatives", Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi. Return to Text. 13. Jain, L.C. and K. Coelho.1996 . "In the wake of Freedom: India’s Tryst with Cooperatives", Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi. Return to Text. 14. Baviskar, B. S. and D.W Attwood. 1991 . "Fertile Grounds: Why do Cooperatives Flourish in Western India?", IASSI Quarterly 9, no. 4: 82–99. Return to Text. 15. As quoted in " Co-operative Societies In India (undated) " p.176. [http://lib.unipune.ac.in:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/2745/10_chapter%204.pdf?sequence=10&isAllowed=y]. Last accessed on July 28, 2021. Return to Text. 16. Supra Note No 7. Return to Text. 17. Supra Note No 15, pp. 164-65. Return to Text. 18. Agarwal, B. 2010 . " Rethinking Agricultural Production Collectivities ", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 45, Issue. 9, pp. 64–78, February 27. [https://www.epw.in/journal/2010/09/special-articles/rethinking-agricultural-production-collectivities.html]. Return to Text. 19. As per available information there were 67,755 mutually aided cooperative societies, 7374 producers’ companies, and 1277 multi-state cooperatives. Return to Text. 20. Supra Note No 1, p.6. Return to Text. 21. Supra Note No 12. Return to Text. 22. Mishra, P. 2021. " Change of Law: Plans to bring co-ops under Concurrent List ", Financial Express , July 22. [https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/change-of-law-plans-to-bring-co-ops-under-concurrent-list/2295153/]. Last accessed on July 28. Return to Text. 23. Attwood, D. W. and Baviskar B. S . 1988 . "Who shares? Cooperatives and Rural Development", Oxford University Press , New Delhi. Return to Text. 24. Shah, T. 1996 . "Catalysing Co-operation: Design of Self-Governing Organisations", Sage Publications , New Delhi. Return to Text. 25. For example, the share of Credit Cooperatives has declined from 62% in 1992-93 to 13.4 % 2016-17. Return to Text. 26. Dave Grace & Associates. 2014 . " Measuring the Size and Scope of the Cooperative Economy: Results of the 2014 Global Census on Co-operatives ", April. [ https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/2014/coopsegm/grace.pdf]. Last accessed on July 23, 2021. Return to Text. 27. NITI Aayog . 2017 . "India: Three Year Action Agenda,2017-18-2019-20", NITI Aayog, New Delhi. Return to Text. 28. NITI Aayog. 2018 . "Strategy for New India@75", NITI Aayog, New Delhi. Return to Text. 29. Ray, S. 2021 . " Birth of an Alternative Development Paradigm: Unfolding of Transformative Mode of Production ", ICAS:MP Occasional Paper Series-1. [https://micasmp.hypotheses.org/occasional-paper-1]. Last accessed on June 25, 2021. Return to Text. 30. Nash, J. et al. (ed). 1976 . "Popular Participation in Social Change: Cooperatives, Collectives and Nationalised Industry", Mouton Publisher, The Hague. Return to Text. 31. Roy, E.P. 1981 . "Cooperatives: Development, Principles and Management", The Interstate Printer & Publishers, Danville. Return to Text. 32. Shylendra, H.S. 2013 . "Microfinance and Cooperatives in India: Can the poor gain from their coming together?" International Journal of Rural Management , Vol. 9, Issue. 2, pp.151-181. Return to Text.

The call for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) has long featured on the agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and found mention in its manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The issue is not new either for the BJP or for Indian politics: it has been at the centre – and sidelines – of political and legislative debates for well over a century and a half. The BJP was the first party in the country to promise the implementation of UCC if it were to be elected into power. Now that it holds the reins of power, it may be a matter of days before the subject leapfrogs from the cycle of debates to actual law. The urgency seems unavoidable given the ruling party’s recent history with regard to the revocation of Article 370, rendering all forms of talaq to be void, in the context of the talaq-i-biddat, and the determination it has shown towards the construction of the Ram temple in Ayodhya. PDF [498 KB] Keeping in mind the right wing political narrative dominant in the country, the recent pronouncements made in political quarters as well as by the Supreme Court, C.K. Mathew, who was Chief Secretary of Rajasthan before retiring from the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), traces the trajectory of the UCC debate, linking it to the contentious evolution of the Hindu Code Bill, and other key developments since independence, such as the Shah Bano case. He draws also attention to international experiences from Rome, France, and the UK and other countries, including the Islamic nations. Mathew accepts that UCC has been a long-pending matter and also that it is arguably a necessary push in the direction of equity and freedom, especially with regard to gender. And yet he advises caution in applying it to a diverse people with varying degrees of religious sensibilities. The way forward, he says, is not to force it on an unwilling people but to follow the middle path of voluntary adoption, as once suggested by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the Constitution of India and the country’s first Law Minister, B.R. Ambedkar: "It is perfectly possible that the future parliament may make a provision by way of making a beginning that the Code shall apply only to those who make a declaration that they are prepared to be bound by it, so that in the initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. " [Emphasis by author.] CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND III. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE IV. THE FOUR HINDU ACTS V. A SECULAR MARRIAGE ACT AND SHAH BANO VI. THE GOA FAMILY LAW VII. THE HINDU CODE: DEBATES, DILUTIONS, AND THE CALL FOR A UNIFORM CIVIL CODE VIII. COMMON CIVIL CODES: SOME INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES IX. THE PATH AHEAD X. AMBEDKAR’S COUNSEL   I. INTRODUCTION The ongoing political narratives in India, seen in newspaper columns, heard in drawing rooms, and bolstered by specific statements by political leaders from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies are pointers towards moves to put in place a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) by the nationalist right wing on India’s proud, plural, and diverse country and society 1 , 2 . This, however, is not a new debate. The movement for the creation of a UCC for the country is over a 180 years old (if, as we shall see, we take the starting point of this momentous debate as the report of the Second Law Commission of 1835) and has been debated and discussed widely, albeit intermittently, in public and political discourses ever since. The ruling party at the Centre, the BJP, is already speaking of a UCC, which merited a specific subhead in its manifesto for the 2019 Lok Sabha elections: " 11. Uniform Civil Code Article 44 of the Constitution of India lists Uniform Civil Code as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy. BJP believes that there cannot be gender equality till such time India adopts a Uniform Civil Code, which protects the rights of all women, and the BJP reiterates its stand to draft a Uniform Civil Code, drawing upon the best traditions and harmonizing them with the modern times.” 3 An ideologue of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Seshadri Chari, as recently as August 19, 2019, made the case for the BJP government to bring in a UCC on the heels of the revocation of Article 370. “The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) was part of the BJP manifesto and had been of the Jan Sangh’s manifesto too. The RSS has also been claiming it. In fact, the UCC and abrogation of Article 370 have been the longest-­standing demands of the Jan Sangh right from its formation. The only addition in the BJP manifesto is Ram Janmabhoomi." 4 The present is, therefore, is an appropriate moment to look at the past. The intention to bring in the UCC has been articulated. What we have seen from the government so far is a track record of enforcing legislation as a solution to contentious issues, (Article 370 being the most recent example). Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Union Home Minister, Amit Shah have shown a steely determination to push ahead with their decisions.  The choice of issues addressed also suggests that much thought and deliberation have gone into the process: the criminalisation of Triple Talaq is a prime example. But for some stray objections which a flailing Congress party could summon up, there was general approval for the steps taken. The government of the day, it appears, chooses it battles carefully, and then steps in relentlessly, leaving the bewildered Opposition disunited and in disarray. Therefore, this seems to be an opportune moment for the government to address the long pending matter of a UCC. A careful look at the manner in which the issue of the UCC evolved in India will be fruitful for all of us and shall assist us in arriving at a better understanding the complex issues involved. Return to Contents II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Second Law Commission, constituted by the British Government, which submitted its report in 1835, which stressed the need for uniformity in codification of Indian law relating to crimes, evidences and contracts, however, specifically recommended that personal laws of Hindus and Muslims should be kept outside such codification. "In their Second Report the Commission examined the problems of Lex Loci and codification and came to the conclusion that 'what India wants is a body of substantive civil law, in preparing which the law of England should be used as the basis, but which, once enacted, should be the law of India on the subject it embraced. And such a body of law, prepared as it ought to be with a constant regard to the condition and institutions of India, and character, religions, usages of the population, would, we are convinced, be of great importance to that country.' The Commission also recommended that codification should not extend to matters like the personal laws of the Hindus and Mohammedans which derived their authority from their respective religions. " 5 [Emphasis by author] The Report was informed by the views of J.H. Harington, member of the Viceroy’s Council in Bengal, who argued against a more general application of British laws to the inhabitants of the country. He did so on three grounds: first, that the fixed habits, manners and prejudices and the long established local customs were totally opposite in principle and practice to that of England; second, that the people here are not only ignorant of the language in which these laws were written, but could not possibly acquire a knowledge of "our complex, though excellent, system of municipal law"; and third, that the laws of England could not be applied here, as they ought to be "suitable to the genius of the people and all the circumstances in which they may be placed". 6 The conscious decision taken by the 1835 Report was to separate the personal laws of the various religions and communities of India and keep it out of the proposed codification. Ultimately, this was reflected in Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858 – issued when the British government took over the sovereign power of the administration of the country after displacing the East India Company in the wake of the 1857 revolt – promising absolute non-interference in religious matters. "We do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under Us, that they abstain from all interference with the Religious Belief or Worship of any of Our subjects, on pain of Our highest Displeasure." 7 This specifically meant the clear separation of the two spheres of law. The public sphere, governed by the British and Anglo-Indian law, in crime, land relations, laws of contract and evidence, which applied equally to every citizen irrespective of religion; and the personal laws of the people on matters such as inheritance, succession, marriage, and religious ceremonies and so on. Three contextual issues There are three issues that immediately crop up: 1. One; it could be argued that it was probably wise in 1858 for a foreign colonial power to stay clear of the dangers of dabbling in areas related to religion and personal custom in the overall interest of maintaining peace and tranquillity in the nation. This emphasises the wisdom inherent in the Queen’s Proclamation, for it was then necessary to soothe the troubled storm waters of the 1857 turmoil. In the present context, it could be further argued that in independent India, where sovereignty rests with the people under a constitutional democracy, there is no external constraint that can prevent the Indian government –  duly and successively elected to power on the principle of universal suffrage for seven decades – to legislate on a common uniform personal code to govern the personal sphere of law such as marriages and succession etc.      2. Two; it is not only non-Hindus who may have severe objections to the promulgation of a law that will govern their most inherent beliefs and faith as well as customs and practices. There has been opposition to the principle in question amongst sections of the Hindus as well because of wide variations in customs amongst its many castes and communities. In fact, when the issue was being hotly debated in the Parliament during the discussions on the Hindu Code, some apologists for the status quo referred to the Vedas and the dharmashashtras , stating that the rule of conduct is the highest law: they tried to place custom and tradition on a pedestal even above the protection of human rights.  Other speakers, while supporting the need for a UCC, cleverly disguised their opposition by emphasising the need to respect diversity amongst the various communities and castes within the Hindus. Of course, some of the more vocal critics spoke about the dangers to the Hindu religion if the UCC was approved. 8       3. And three, and in favour of the UCC, it is also well known that the Hindu law for a long time discriminated against women by depriving them of inheritance, remarriage and divorce. Their condition, especially those of Hindu widows and daughters, was poor due to this and other prevalent customs. Could religious practices be employed to deny basic fundamental rights and freedoms to women? Could not the UCC be employed to rectify the errors of a rigid discriminatory society and bring greater equity and compassion into social life? Of course, the question applied to other religions as well, especially the inconsistencies obvious within Muslim law that discriminated against women in more obvious and apparent ways. It is also understood that the general mood of the country recognises the urgent imperative to enable the Muslim woman to find her own identity and establish herself as an individual.  Return to Contents III. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE Progressive sections in British-ruled India and women’s organisations protested the discrimination against women and this led to a spate of laws passed with respect to the Hindus which were beneficial to women, such as the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, Married Women's Property Act of 1874, with its Amendment Act of 1923,  and the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act of 1928, which in a significant move, permitted a Hindu woman's right to property. 9 So also the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act of 1937 was a significant step for assuring rights to women. Earlier the share of the deceased husband used to pass on to the other co-sharers of the property. With the promulgation of this Act, its most important provision was to give the widow the same rights which her husband had enjoyed while he was alive. The growing tide of legislation that delved into personal issues of ordinary men and women of the country, generated debate and controversy and required a reasoned and measured response from the government of the day. B.N. Rau Committee and Codifying Hindu Law This finally led to the setting up in 1941 of the B.N. Rau Committee – officially the Hindu Law Committee – whose task it was to examine the question of the necessity of common Hindu laws. Rau was an Indian civil servant, jurist, diplomat and statesman known for his key role in drafting the Constitution of India as Adviser to Constituent Assembly. The B.N. Rau Committee recommended a codified Hindu law, which would give equal rights to women in keeping with the modern trends of society. However, it must be mentioned that its focus was primarily on reforming the Hindu law in accordance with the scriptures. The committee reviewed the 1937 Act and recommended a civil code of marriage and succession for Hindus. After much study, it presented the government with two draft Bills on March 1942 regarding intestate succession and marriage. Unable to clinch the matter, the Rau Committee was revived and reconstituted once more in 1944: it finally sent its report to the Indian Parliament with a draft Bill in February 1947. The Rau Committee report dealt comprehensively with Intestate and Testamentary Succession including Maintenance, Marriage and Divorce, Minority and Guardianship and Adoption. As procedure demanded, the draft went before a select committee again, this time chaired by Ambedkar himself. When it finally came up for discussion in February 1951, India was already a free nation. Discussions continued, but were endless, the Hindu Code Bill lapsed and was re-submitted only in 1952.   The provisions had to be broken up into separate parts, apparently to nudge through the radical changes in smaller steps, rather than as a wholescale transformation.  The Hindu Marriage Bill was passed in May 1955, and the Hindu Succession Act in June 1956.  Later, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Bill was passed in August 1956 and the final component, the Adoptions and Maintenance Bill in December 1956. The Hindu Code and the "curious" call for a UCC The question remains to this day: why was the personal law of the Hindus alone being codified and why a uniform code for the entire populace was not being attempted by the framers of the Constitution? G.R. Rajagopaul, himself a witness to the developments of those momentous days, as a member of a "small committee" set up by Ambedkar "to examine" the Hindu Code Bill when it was pending in the Constituent Assembly in 1948, attempts an answer: "…it was felt that an attempt should be made to codify the Hindu law and if this succeeded, and of the measures produced thereby had in themselves intrinsic merits commending them for universal application, the time would not be far off when other communities might like to follow suit and ask for reconsideration of their own law in the light of changed situations." 10 It was a pious hope, but that one that did not materialise.   The Hindu Code that had been prepared in this context had the stamp of Ambedkar who, as a radical thinker, had criticised the Hindu law on many an occasion. The draft Hindu Code Bill received much criticism and the issues that were opposed pertained to monogamy, divorce, abolition of coparcenary (women inheriting a shared title) and inheritance to daughters. The first President of the country, Rajendra Prasad, opposed these reforms; other critics included Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, a few senior members and Hindu fundamentalist parties. The fundamentalists called it "anti-Hindu" and "anti-Indian". In order to deliberately stall the proceedings, they demanded a UCC applicable to all religions and not only for the Hindus 11 .  In fact, the opposition to the Hindu Code Bill, in the form presented to the Parliament, came from an array of members representing various factions of the Hindu majority and others within and without the Parliament. As mentioned above, the most important of them were conservative hardliners of the Congress party, among them veterans like Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, and J.B. Kripalani who had a completely different world view from Nehru’s. Rajendra Prasad even threatened to refuse Presidential assent to the Bills: Patel concurred in private, but was disinclined to argue with Nehru. The other critics included "the Hindu fundamentalists within the Congress Party who were substantial in number led by Deputy Speaker M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar" 12 ; the Hindu Mahasabha and its women’s wing, "with representatives like Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, N.C. Chatterjee and others who opposed the Bill strongly for threatening the so-called religious foundations of Hindu society." 13 Importantly, Som throws light on how the UCC came into the political narrative, and why and how Ambedkar responded to this move for a common code: "By using inverse logic the Mahasabha leaders tried to suggest that the Hindu Code was, after all, a communal measure and a uniform Civil Code should have been made instead, to give effect to the secular ideals of the country. The motives of the Mahasabha, however, were betrayed when Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee made the suggestion that the Hindu Code be optional. Ambedkar was provoked into dismissing S. P. Mukherjee's remarks as not worth serious consideration since he had after all, as member of Nehru's Cabinet, whole-heartedly supported the Code which he was now opposing. Ambedkar also pointed out that innocuous suggestion that a uniform Civil Code be initiated seemed curious, as he wondered how could opponents of the Bill turn overnight into protagonists of a Civil Code." 14 Som also gives details of the other groups which opposed the Hindu Code: the Sikh group "who resented being clubbed with the Hindus" and feared that the Code would be an attempt to absorb them into the Hindu fold; the Muslim group who "were obviously encouraged by the Hindu fundamentalist group within the Congress to tilt the scales in their favour"; and finally, the women parliamentarians, not because they were opposed to the Code, but because they felt that the measures "were not going far enough". The arguments they pushed forward included the following: the need to protect the hallowed traditions of the Hindu shastras ; the resentment arising from the fact that the Muslim Personal Law remained untouched; the proposed measures affecting the bulk of the population had not been  circulated so as to ascertain public opinion and was being pushed through hastily; and, most importantly, the  grant of equal property rights to women threatened the well-entrenched economic rights of the male in the society. It was the powerful voice of Nehru that kept the discussion going. He was disgusted by the repeated by the pristine references to the Hindu shastras . "For Nehru, the Hindu Code was a necessary reform measure which fitted into his larger perspective of all-round national development. As he put it, 'we talk about Five Year Plans, of economic progress, industrialization, political freedom and all that. They are all highly important. But I have no doubt in my mind that the real progress of the country means progress not only on the political plane, not only on the economic plane, but also on the social plane. They have to be integrated, all these, when the great nation goes forward.'" 15 The women Members of Parliament, had previously thrown their weight with the fundamentalists; but now, probably influenced by Nehru, they began to understand the contradictions they would have to confront as the Hindu Code was going a long way in granting them significant rights. In a significant political move, they reversed their position, and backed the Hindu law reform. They feared that publicly allying with the conservative Hindu group would cause a further setback to their rights and seriously damage their future attempts to gain equality with their men folk in all other matters. Ultimately, therefore, an abridged and diluted version of this Bill was passed by the Parliament in 1956, which while excluding non-Hindus from the ambit of the reform, brought into the statute books four separate Acts, namely the Hindu Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, Minority and Guardianship Act and the Adoptions and Maintenance Act. In a gesture to indicate the willingness of Parliament to consider the issue of a uniform code at some later point in time, it was decided to add the implementation of a UCC in Article 44 as a Directive Principle specifying that "The State shall endeavour to secure for citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India." This decision to include the UCC only as a non-justiciable Directive Principle rather than as a justiciable Article was opposed by progressive women members like Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and Hansa Mehta. Aparna Mahanta writes that the "failure of the Indian state to provide a uniform civil code, consistent with its democratic secular and socialist declarations, further illustrates the modern state’s accommodation of the traditional interests of a patriarchal society". 16   Return to Contents IV. THE FOUR HINDU ACTS The four laws that came into existence in 1956 may be quickly examined for our understanding. A "remarkable" 17 role was played by H.V. Pataskar, Minister of State in the Law Ministry in not only piloting these Bills through both Houses of Parliament, but also by conducting "frequent informal meetings to encourage accommodation." 18   A: The first of them, the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, is included as part of the Hindu Code Bills. The main purpose of this enactment was to amend and codify the laws relating to marriage among Hindus and others; others meaning in this context, the Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Besides the amendment and codification of Sastrik Law, it introduced separation and divorce which was earlier non-existent in Sastrik Law. This enactment brought uniformity of law for all sections of Hindus.   Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 says: "This Act applies -            a. to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj;            b. to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion; and            c. to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Explanation . The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be:            a. any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;            b. any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and           c. any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.         2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.      3. The expression "Hindu" in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section." 19 The Act provided for conditions under which a Hindu marriage was to be solemnised, registration of such marriages, the restitution of conjugal rights as well as judicial separation, the provision for divorces, punishment for divorces etc. The application of the Act to all Hindus by religion in all of the religion’s derivatives, while also clubbing together other religions, namely Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs, was initially a point of concern and debate, though with the passage of time, it seems to have been accepted by all the people. It needs to be pointed out here that with the passage of the amended Anand Marriage Act, Sikhs now also have their own personal law related to marriage. The Indian Parliament cleared the Anand Marriage Amendment Bill in 2012, which paved the way for the validation of Sikh traditional marriages, amending the Anand Marriage Act of 1909, thus providing for compulsory registration of "Anand Karaj" marriages. With the new legislation, couples whose marriages have been registered under this Act will not be required to get their marriage registered under the Registration of Births, Marriages and Deaths Act, 1969, or any other law for the time being in force. However, the UK does not recognise such marriages and Sikh British citizens still require a legal English marriage as per law. In passing it may be mentioned that the Hindu Marriage Act still shows its provisions as being applicable to Hindus as well as Sikhs. B: The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 , is the second of the Acts of the Parliament, under the umbrella of what was envisaged as the Hindu Code, enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate or unwilled succession, among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs. Hailed for its consolidation of Hindu laws on succession into one, this Act lays down a uniform and comprehensive system of inheritance and applies to persons governed by all schools of religious thought such as the Mitākṣarā and Dāyabhāga schools. 20 "One of the important differences between the two schools is that under the Dayabhaga, the father is regarded as the absolute owner of his property whether it is self-acquired or inherited from his ancestors. Mitakshara law draws a distinction between ancestral property (referred to as joint family property or coparcenary property) and separate (e.g. property inherited from mother) and self-acquired properties. In the case of ancestral properties, a son has a right to that property equal to that of his father by the very fact of his birth. The term son includes paternal grandsons and paternal great-grandsons who are referred to as coparceners. An important category of ancestral property is property inherited from one's father, paternal grandfather and paternal great-grand father." 21 The Hindu woman's limited estate was abolished by the Act. Any property possessed by a Hindu female is to be held by her as her absolute property and she is given full power to deal with it and dispose it of according to her will. Parts of this Act were amended in 2005 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, which revised rules on coparcenary property, giving daughters of the deceased equal rights with sons, and subjecting them to the same liabilities and disabilities. The amendment essentially furthers equal rights between males and females in the legal system. The applicability of this Act is similar to Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, quoted above. The anomaly mentioned with regard to the Hindu Marriage Act whereby persons of certain other religions were clubbed with the Hindus though they may not be Hindus by religion continues to be an issue. C: The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,   1956, was the third of the statutes introduced as part of the Hindu Code. The Act was meant to enhance the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890, not serve as its replacement. This Act specifically served to define guardianship relationships between adults and minors, as well as between people of all ages and their respective property. A minor and a guardian were defined in this Act as follows: 4. "Definitions.—In this Act,—      a. "minor" means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen years;      b. "guardian" means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of both his person and property, and includes— a natural guardian, a guardian appointed by the will of the minor’s father or mother, a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment relating to any Court of wards.     c. "natural guardian" means any of the guardians mentioned in section 6."   Section 6 says: "6. Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.—The natural guardians of a Hindu minor; in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor’s property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are—        a. in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother;     b. in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl—the mother, and after her, the father;     c. in the case of a married girl—the husband:   Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section—     a. if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or       b. if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or  an ascetic (yati or sanyasi).   Explanation.—In this section, the expressions "father" and "mother" do not include a step-father and a step-mother." 22 As with the other Acts of the Hindu Code, this Act also applies to all Hindus, including those who practise the religions of Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism. Both legitimate and illegitimate minors with at least one parent, fall under the jurisdiction of this Act. The father is the primary guardian for a legitimate boy and unmarried girl and their property, while the mother is the secondary guardian. However, the mother is the primary guardian for all children under the age of five. For illegitimate children, the mother is the primary guardian, while the father is the secondary guardian. A married girl’s husband becomes her guardian. For an adoptive son, the adoptive father is the primary guardian, then the adoptive mother. Should a parent cease being a Hindu or become a renouncer, hermit, or ascetic, that parent will lose his or her guardian rights. D: The last of the statutes of the Hindu Code enacted by Parliament in 1956 was the  Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act . This Act dealt specifically with the legal process of adopting children by a Hindu adult, as well as the legal obligations of a Hindu to provide "maintenance" to various family members including, but not limited to, his wife or wives, parents, and in-laws. In Hindu Vedas, begetting a son is one of the three debts that a Hindu was required to discharge in this world. Yet, illegitimate sons also have their rights, acknowledged from the Vedic age to this date. Some of the illegitimate sons were also fitted into the system of sonship and those who were left out were never denied maintenance. It was believed that the one who was responsible, either directly or indirectly, for the birth of a child, had to provide for its maintenance. These ideas are reflected in the provisions of the Act. This Act too, like the other three Acts mentioned above, has been made applicable to Hindus and all those considered under the umbrella term of Hindus, including Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. Illegitimate children also shall get the benefit of maintenance under the provisions of the Act. Persons who are Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews are excluded from this definition. Moreover, if the wife is not a Hindu, then the husband is not bound to provide maintenance for her under this Act under modern Hindu Law. The fact remains that the separate Acts under what would have been a Hindu Code, while bringing some form of uniformity in social and religious customs, failed to control the prevalent gender discrimination. As the Acts applied only to Hindus, and religions under the umbrella term ‘Hindu’, women from the other religions remained victims of male chauvinism and other forms of prejudices. Especially so, the Muslim women who did not get the benefit of inheritance of agricultural land. Nehru accepted that the Bill was incomplete, but was reluctant to make too many drastic changes which could stir the anger of other communities. But he took pride in the fact that it was an "outstanding achievement" of his time. 23 His principle of women’s equality as an ideal to be pursued in Indian politics was eventually accepted by the previous critics of the Bill. A UCC, for him, was essential for the country, but he hesitated in forcing it down upon any community, especially if that community was not ready for such a reform. Indeed, his vision of uniformity was not forcibly enforced, but was added as a desirable objective under the Directive Principles of the Constitution.  Return to Contents V. A SECULAR MARRIAGE ACT AND SHAH BANO An Act which predated the above statutes, namely the Special Marriage Act, 1954, also deserves a place in this analysis. This Act provides for civil marriage for any citizen irrespective of religion, thus permitting any Indian to have their marriage outside the boundaries of any religious personal law. The law applied to all of India, except Jammu and Kashmir, though it would apply there too, when amendments to Article 370 come into operation. Though the Act is almost identical to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, it gives some idea as to how secularised the law regarding marriages had become. The Special Marriage Act allowed Muslims to marry under its provisions and thereby retain their protections, generally beneficial to Muslim women, which could not be found in their personal law. Under this Act polygamy was illegal, and inheritance and succession would be governed by the Indian Succession Act, rather than the respective Muslim personal law. Divorce also would be governed by the secular law, and maintenance of a divorced wife would be along the lines set down in the civil law. While distinct from the Hindu personal law, the Act provided the safeguards that had been considered in the statutes of the Hindu Code to the Muslim beneficiaries of the Act. The Shah Bano case We need to take some time to consider a possible historic opportunity that had presented itself to the Rajiv Gandhi government to make substantial changes to the position and status of Muslim women. This pertains to what is now known as the Shah Bano case of 1985. Bano was a 73-year-old woman who bravely, and with much courage, sought maintenance allowance from her husband, Muhammad Ahmad Khan, who divorced her after 40 years of marriage by the triple talaaq system as permitted under the Muslim personal law. He refused her claim for maintenance and the matter went into protracted legal proceedings. Though Bano was initially granted maintenance by the verdict of a local court in 1980, the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court, which finally ruled in her favour under the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, (Cr.P.C) 1973, which applied to all citizens irrespective of religion. It further recommended that the long pending UCC be set be finally enacted. The Shah Bano judgment observed thus:  "It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter. It provides that "The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India". There is no evidence of any official activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief seems to have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their personal law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and, unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in the case whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is one thing, the political courage to use that competence is quite another. We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal Laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case." 24 Before Shah Bano , two other Muslim women had previously received maintenance under the Criminal code in 1979 and 1980. The relevant section of the Cr. P.C. reads as follows: "125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain…his wife, unable to maintain herself… a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife… at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct." 25 It is relevant to observe that the maximum amount payable under this provision is only Rs 500 a month. However, the Shah Bano case soon became a hotly debated political issue. It is interesting to note that after the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, most of the minorities in India, with Muslims being the largest, feared attacks on their identity and felt the need to safeguard their culture. 26 Muslim conservatives accused the government of encouraging Hindu dominance over every Indian citizen at the expense of the minorities. The Criminal Procedure Code was seen as a threat to the Muslim personal law, which they considered their cultural identity. According to them, the judiciary recommending a UCC was evidence that Hindu values would be imposed over every Indian. The possible reason for this was the animosity between hardline fundamentalist sections in the two religions: The Hindu Code being well established in the country by now, the fear amongst the minorities was that its provisions would become the template for superimposition on the minorities. This was an unexpressed fear that could not be reasonably satisfied through logic and discussions.  The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, 1986 The worst effect of this case can be seen in the succumbing of the Rajiv Gandhi Government, when it passed a law nullifying the Supreme Court judgment through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act, 1986. This made Sec. 125 non-operable for Muslim women. According to this, maintenance was payable to the divorced wife only during the iddat period (the mandatory waiting period when the divorce matters are being settled), and not thereafter. The fate of the divorced woman after the iddat period remained dark and uncertain. This act of the government was viewed by large sections of citizens, including Muslim women, with contempt and fury and may have resulted in the loss of confidence of the people in the party. 27 The Muslim orthodoxy felt threatened by the judiciary-directed modification of the Muslim personal law. Rajiv Gandhi's Congress government, which previously had their support, lost elections in December 1989 perhaps because of its initial endorsement of the Supreme Court's decision and its later turnaround by passing the Muslim (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Women Act, 1986. The members of the Muslim Personal Law board started a campaign for complete autonomy in their personal laws and this became a national issue as can be seen from the news coverage of the time. An independent Muslim Member of Parliament proposed a Bill in the Lok Sabha to protect the community’s personal law. Sensing the political error that it had committed and its impact on the Muslim vote-bank, the Congress Party reversed its previous position and supported this Bill.  The Hindu right, the Left, Muslim liberals and women's organisations strongly condemned it. The debate now centred on the divinity of the Muslim personal law and the claim that a judicial court had no role to play in such matters. It also led to a situation of defining a woman's right according to her specific community, with Congress political leader Jaffar Sharief saying, "today, in the Shah Bano's case, I am finding that many people are more sympathetic towards Muslim women than their own women. This is very strange." 28 It would not be out of place to say that the legal reversal of introducing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act of 1986 29 , significantly also dampened the national women's movement of all religions and civic groups in the 1980s. An opportunity squandered? It may well be argued that the Rajiv Gandhi government squandered a historic opportunity to bring about a significant reformation of the rights of Muslim women. Given the specific intent of the Supreme Court, the Government could have taken the great leap forward.  In fact, the Supreme Court had quoted Dr Tahrir Mahmood from his book Muslim Personal Law (1977 edition pp. 200-202) as he exhorted the Muslim Community: "instead of wasting their energies in exerting theological and political pressure to secure an 'immunity' for their traditional personal law from the state's legislative jurisdiction, the Muslim will do well to begin by exploring and demonstrating how the true Islamic laws, purged of their time-worn and anachronistic interpretations, can enrich the common civil code." This was signal enough for the government to have initiated reforms which would have had a salutary and far-reaching impact on the community and the country as a whole. Return to Contents VI. THE GOA FAMILY LAW Surprisingly, Goa is the only State in India which has a form of UCC. The Goa Family Law, originating from the Portuguese Civil Code, continued to be implemented even after Goa's annexation in 1961 30 . A word about the mother law may not be out of place: The Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 - which was extended to Portugal’s overseas provinces including Goa in November, 1869 - is a remarkable piece of legislation promulgated by King Luiz Augusto Rebello da Silva. Comprising 2538 articles, it underwent various legislative amendments from time to time by inclusion of other related laws such as law of marriage, protection of children, divorce, civil registration, civil procedure etc. Interestingly it defines important concepts of civil law, including its scope, the sources of rights and obligations etc. The function of civil law has been defined thus: "Civil Law recognizes and specifies such rights and corresponding duties; ensures and protects the enjoyment of rights and the performance of duties; lays down the circumstances in which a citizen may be disabled from exercising rights and the manner in which such disability may be overcome." It is significant to note that within the scope of Article 9, and through a separate decree of 16 December 1880, "it ordered safeguarding in favour of the gentile Hindus of Goa, without distinction of Old and New Conquests, their special and peculiar usages and customs reviewed and codified by this decree." 31 There is a lesson for us in there somewhere; a Christian Catholic Government situated in Lisbon, ordering the protection of the customs and practices of its Hindu subjects, residing in faraway Goa on the Indian sub-continent. And this happened about 140 years ago.  The Goa Family Law was in the news not long ago: The Supreme Court drew attention to this as recently as September 2019, when it observed in Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira : "21. However, Goa is a shining example of an Indian State which has a uniform civil code applicable to all, regardless of religion except while protecting certain limited rights. It would also not 5 (1985) 2 SCC 556 6 (1995) 3 SCC 635  be out of place to mention that with effect from 22.12.2016 certain portions of the Portuguese Civil Code have been repealed and replaced by the Goa Succession, Special Notaries and Inventory Proceedings Act, 2012 which, by and large, is in line with the Portuguese Civil Code. The salient features with regard to family properties are that a married couple jointly holds the ownership of all the assets owned before marriage or acquired after marriage by each spouse. Therefore, in case of divorce, each spouse is entitled to half share of the assets. The law, however, permits pre­nuptial agreements which may have a different system of division of assets. Another important aspect, as pointed out earlier, is that at least half of the property has to pass to the legal heirs as legitime. This, in some ways, is akin to the concept of ‘coparcenary’ in Hindu law. However, as far as Goa is concerned, this legitime will also apply to the self­acquired properties. Muslim men whose marriages are registered in Goa cannot practice polygamy. Further, even for followers of Islam there is no provision for verbal divorce." 32 However, Ramakant D. Khalap, who was the Chairman of the Goa Law Commission (April 2009-March 2012), raises two fundamental questions: The first is whether the family laws in Goa truly "uniform"? "That the Family Laws of Goa are uniform in all respects is a misconception which we have tried to expose through our Report No.21 aptly titled as the "Protection of Institution of Marriage Bill 2012". This Bill and the accompanying Report and Statement of Objects and Reasons highlight how the "Concordata" i.e. the Treaty signed between the King of Portugal and the Holy See (The Pope) in 1940 permits the Catholics to get married in Church but simultaneously takes away the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of separation of spouses, annulment of Marriage and Divorce and further proceeds to make our constitutionally created High Court of Judicature a mere post office performing the onerous task of conveying the decrees of the Canonical Courts to the Civil Registrars for recording the dissolution of marriage in the marriage Register maintained by the Civil Registrar. The law vests no power in the High Court to examine the Decrees of Canonical Courts on the touchstone of Constitutional validity or Public Policy. The very fact that such an anachronism on the legal system of the Country could continue for well over 50 Years after liberation emphasizes the ["raison d'etre"] of a validly constituted Law Reforms Commission." 33 He continues by pondering over the issue of a civil code and Article 44: "Should Goa or for that matter India have a Civil Code of its own? This is a million dollar question. We toyed with this idea for a considerable time. It is a gigantic work and requires perhaps a specially constituted Law Commission for the sole purpose of drafting a Civil Code for the State of Goa and or the Country as a whole. We leave this issue to the powers that be and hope that one day the dream enshrined in Article 44 of the Constitution of India will be realized." 34 We must, of course, keep in mind that there are some discordant views about the Goan law itself. The tolerance of bigamy amongst Hindus, the essentiality of church marriages and prohibition of divorce for Catholics, etc are oddly anachronistic in the modern world.  Further, Albertina Almeida, a prominent Goan lawyer had this to say:  "The 'Goans' (meaning the dominant class/caste Goans) on the one hand have been wanting to distinguish themselves from the Portuguese, and from the  mestiços  (mixed race of Portuguese and Goan parents), and on the other hand also want to distinguish themselves from the rest of India, while maintaining all the distinctions that they have already made between themselves. It suited the Goan to distinguish himself from the non-Goan (the rich ‘Indian’) and the migrant by whom he felt overwhelmed either because of larger power potential or numbers. Be it in the field of law, music, song and dance, cuisine, games, language, art, architecture…..the story is the same. In and through all these fields of life, there is a desire to consolidate the existing power equations. This has been further strengthened by the economic driver of tourism, which has taken the form of neo-colonialism, and where it was essential to stereotype the image of an exotic Goan with a different image of a hybrid between Indian and Iberian culture." 35 Evidently, the Goan personal law, often touted as a model that could be followed by the minority community, has its own fault lines. Return to Contents VII. THE HINDU CODE: DEBATES, DILUTIONS, AND THE CALL FOR A UNIFORM CIVIL CODE As we harken back to those tumultuous days of intense debates in the parliament, in the final analysis it may be said it stands to the credit of Nehru that the Hindu Code was at all passed, though in an abridged fashion. The UCC as originally envisaged was never realized. It remained a pious hope, caught among the linguistic trappings of Article 44 of the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Muslim law remained untouched: it was several decades later that instant triple talaq was outlawed by a strong pro-Hindu government; and though clerics opposed it, the modern Indian, and the world in general, largely welcomed the measure. There are those who would argue later that the objections raised in the Parliament during the debate on the Hindu Code, could have been talked through, if persistence and determination could have steadied the legislative intent. Nehru was conscious of the criticism that the amendments that were finally approved diminished the Bill. But he was always to hold the view that one had to make a beginning somewhere and that the essential principles underlying the changes were not given up. Even those Parliamentarians who did not see eye to eye with him did concede that without him, the legislation would not have been passed at all. Amrit Kaur said it succinctly when she commented that the social reforms that are now on the Statute Book would have been talked out if it had not been for Jawaharlal’s powerful advocacy and insistence on them. 36 The debate surrounding the UCC, with its far-reaching implications for all religions and communities, combined with undeniable impact on issues pertaining to the secular nature of this country, is one of the most controversial subject of current Indian politics. The plural and multi-religious nature of the country and its religious laws, with differentiation not only in caste and religion, but even in region and sects, further complicates the issue. Women's rights groups have argued that this is not so: the only issue is the protection of their rights and security, irrespective of religion and the possibility of its misuse by political groups. 37 "Neither necessary nor desirable": 21 st Law Commission In the midst of all this clamour, it was a little unexpected, though perhaps cautionary, that the 21 st Law Commission struck a wary note. In the initial paragraphs of its report dated August 31, 2018, it wrote: "While diversity of Indian culture can and should be celebrated, specific groups or weaker sections of the society must not be dis-privileged in the process. Resolution of this conflict does not mean abolition of difference. This Commission has, therefore, dealt with laws that are discriminatory rather than providing a uniform civil code which is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage [emphasis by author]. Most countries are now moving towards recognition of difference, and the mere existence of difference does not imply discrimination, but is indicative of a robust democracy." (Para 1.15) 38 That said, one must also factor in the Hindu nationalists view this issue in the light of the concept of their laws enshrined in the four Acts collectively called the Hindu Code, which they say, is secular and equal to both sexes. The BJP was the first party in the country to promise the implementation of UCC if it were to be elected into power. Now that it holds the reins of power, it may be but a matter of days before the subject holds centre stage in the never-ending debates of our complex and fascinating country. From another perspective, the UCC’s importance for gender equality cannot be denied and in a country like India, where women’s rights are daily contested and often denied, this is of special significance. And most significantly, the imperative for reforming the archaic personal laws of Muslims which allow unilateral divorce and polygamy cannot be ignored. The recent law that makes the triple talaaq a crime has found approval among most sections of our society, except the conservative Islamic segments. On a more practical level, the Supreme Court of India has also been asserting the need for a UCC. It had also made certain pronouncements recently in two cases that make it amply clear that it is in favour of a UCC.  In ABC 39 vs The State (NCT of Delhi) decided on July 6. 2015, the court dealt with the issue of guardianship of a Christian unwed mother without the consent of the child’s father. While ruling in the woman’s favour, it said: "It would be apposite for us to underscore that our Directive Principles envision the existence of a uniform civil code, but this remains an unaddressed constitutional expectation." 40 Again, very recently, in Civil Appeal 7378 of 2010 delivered on September 13, 2019, (Jose Paul Coutinho vs Maria Luiza), the Supreme Court stated "Whereas the founders of the Constitution in Article 44 in Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy had hoped and expected that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a Uniform Civil Code throughout the territories of India, till date no action has been taken in this regard." 41 Return to Contents VIII. COMMON CIVIL CODES: SOME INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES It is also pertinent to note that many of the countries of the world do have their own codified civil law applicable on all its citizens uniformly, without fear or favour, affection or malice. Perhaps we have not yet comprehended this fact consciously as a nation. The logic and imperative of having a civil code homogeneously applied on its citizens, irrespective of religion, sex or any other consideration, cannot be overemphasised. A quick survey of some of these civil laws or codes as extant in some other parts of the world will give us a broader view of the requirement of a common code in India. Justinian and the Roman origin We all do know that Civil law refers to a body of rules that attempts to define and make justiciable the private rights of citizens: ideally it offers legal remedies that may be sought in a dispute. It covers all the related areas of law such as contracts, torts, property and family law. The concept of civil law can be traced back to the Romans – although other examples, such as the code of Ur-Nammu of Mesopotamia may be a comparable example – and is a good starting point to trace the evolution of civil law.  The Romans used doctrines to develop a code, specific to the Roman people, that determined how legal issues would be decided. They called it Jus Civile, the legal historical term which embraces all the rules and principles of law derived from the customs and legislations of Rome, as opposed to those derived from the customs of all nations known as jus gentium  or from fundamental ideas of right and wrong implicit in the human mind, known as jus naturale. 42 Emperor Justinian’s personal vision, after he took over the throne in 527 CE, was responsible for this Code: he set about constituting a team of law commissioners to codify all laws and statutes, decrees and writings of jurists etc. At the peak of its development, it covered personal law, family law, contractual law, the law of corporate and mercantile bodies as well as the law of property and possession and succession as well as court procedures. In fact, Roman law remained in use in Europe – and more particularly in Germany – informing the laws of many other countries, well into the 15 century, although it had been interpreted, developed, and adapted to later conditions by generations of jurists and had received additions from non-Roman sources. 43 France and Napoleon’s civil code After the fall of the Roman Empire, the earliest European states that took up this difficult task were the then governments of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony. However, the country that codified the civil laws in a methodical and consultative manner was France. In fact, one of the most well-known and debated civil codes in the world in the modern sense, is that of France. Napoleon’s civil code introduced in France as early as 1804 – though the movement for the unification of existing civil law had begun more than a decade earlier – replaced over 300 hundred local codes of civil law. It superimposed itself on both customary law and existing legal statutes and covered the vast area of property, goods, usufruct, servitudes, succession, wills, gifts, contracts and quasi-contracts. The French code struck a balance between privilege and equality, custom and legal requirements. Napoleon’s personal contribution was significant: he personally attended meetings, while ensuring that the foundations of family life were not disturbed.  The general consensus is that it remains great achievement: "a single Code for the whole of France, substantially based upon the broad historical instincts of the race, while preserving the most valuable social conquests of the revolution." 44 "It supplied a model for other countries to emulate. Later, even when the Code suffered frequent amendments and annulments, changes and deletions, it still symbolized and expressed the legal and moral unity of a great nation. Indeed, the gains made by the sword of the Revolution were washed away when Louis VIII returned in 1815, but she retained what she had conquered by ideas." 45 Plurality in British law On the other hand, the law of UK is not a single code: it has three legal systems, namely, the English law, the Scots law and the law of Northern Ireland. Since 2007, there also exists a purely Welsh law. There is a substantial overlap between these legal systems: each legal system defaults to each area and court systems of each jurisdiction further the relevant system of law through their judgments and the process of jurisprudence. Overarching these separate systems is the law of the United Kingdom, also known as United Kingdom law.  British law arises where laws apply to the United Kingdom and/or its citizens as a whole, most obviously constitutional law, as also, for instance, tax law. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the highest court in the land for all civil cases and is also the final court (in the normal sense of the term) for interpreting United Kingdom law. Note, however, that unlike in other systems (for example the U.S.), the Supreme Court cannot strike down statutes, and its own cases can be expressly overridden by Parliament by virtue of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Germany, China, Russia, and the U.S. Mention of a few other countries as examples would suffice: In Germany , Burgerliches Gesetzbuch is the civil law and became effective in January 1900. In the People’s Republic of China , the General Principles of Civil Law came into force in January 1987.   In Russia , the Civil Code was passed in 1923. Consisting of 435 sections it is marked by the absence of certain topics which hold a prominent place in other codes, such as family relations, contracts of employment, real property etc. The contentious and chilling clause of Section 21 continues: "Land is the property of the State and cannot be the object of private contract. Tenure of the land shall be permitted only under the title of use. Private property in land having been abolished, the division of property into real and personal is hereby repealed." Yet, the Code safeguards civil rights without discrimination in Russia. 46 In the United States , where the question of diversity may approximate more to Indian circumstances, there are multiple layers of laws, separately applicable to the nation, the State and the county, or agencies and cities. States are independent legal entities with their own Supreme Courts that follow their own practices and legal conventions. Yet there are common principles that govern these civil laws in the States in a manner that is applicable for all people across that vast country. Only matters of a federal nature or those affecting the country as a whole such as security, taxation, broad legal issues, etc., are taken up at the Federal Supreme Court. Civil Codes in Islamic countries What about Islamic countries? Most countries following the Islamic faith traditionally adopted Sharia law, derived from religious teachings, practices and traditions, often interpreted by qualified jurists of the faith.  In the modern era, however, such laws have been modified or replaced by statutes inspired by European models. Judicial procedures and legal education were likewise brought in line with European practice.  On the other hand, many of the matters dealing specifically with family law continue to be governed by traditional Sharia laws. This has been a constant source of contestation not only within the countries which observe them, but also from other countries who see certain aspects of the sharia law as being contradictory to human rights and personal freedom. Indeed, there is a continuous movement in progressive Islamic countries to modernize the laws without abandoning the foundations of traditional jurisprudence. In certain other countries with a resurgent Islamic revival, there is a demand to re-instate legal systems based entirely on Sharia law. Thus, the Islamic countries of the world usually have a combination of civil laws based on classical sharia laws (as may be observed in Saudi Arabia), secular systems (Turkey is an example, through there is currently pressure on its secularism) as well as mixed systems (such as are seen in Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria etc. 47 The Indian context An international survey would reveal that, in fact, there are few countries where common civil laws do not exist, dispensing justice in a fair and neutral manner. As we have seen, in India, the nature of the structured and layered social formations, the chaturvarna hierarchies approved and mandated by religion and tradition which have existed for several millennia, complicates the social fabric in more ways than can be decipherer. It may be argued that the immense diversity of social customs, the plurality of social mores and traditions, the staggering variety of rituals and practices and the presence of hundreds of castes and sub-castes, all make our country so complex that to even think of a universal law that will encompass these variations, without trampling on individual freedom and the right to practice one’s chosen religion. In India, the complex mosaic of these overlapping personal, social, local and community traditions and practices make the task of implementing a UCC truly difficult. Yet, if we are to move on to a truly unified country with treats all its citizens with dignity, respect and equity, without sacrificing their basic human rights, while at the time, protecting those individual variations and cultural practices of each community, which do not militate against basic principles of our vast and magnificent Constitution, then we would have achieved a near impossible task. This balance between general principles of civil law and specific traditions of individual religions: that is the desiderata we must aim for. Return to Contents IX. THE PATH AHEAD At present, as we approach the end of the year 2019, the possibility of the Parliament promulgating a UCC looms large on the nation’s polity; perhaps there is a better chance of its getting through now, with the majoritarian government, backed by a massive recent mandate, firmly in the saddle. Efforts in the recent past have not borne fruit. In the Muslim community, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) is clear that it shall oppose any attempts to adopt a UCC. It is the AIMPLB that had organised pressure on the Rajiv Gandhi government in 1986, in the aftermath of the favourable decision in Shah Bano , to adopt The Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights and Divorce Act), Article 5 of which allows a paltry amount to be paid to the divorced wife for a period of a mere three months. Then, it was a major step backward for the country, though an activist judiciary had upheld significant principles of law that should have been accepted. Yet, the recent Act of Parliament renders all declaration of talaq to be void 48 , especially in the context of the talaq-i-biddat (where pronouncement of talaaq thrice in one sitting by a Muslim man to his wife results in instant and irrevocable divorce), found approval in most places, including Muslim women, though clerics of the community still protest. Meanwhile, other Muslim Personal Law Boards were also created, two led by women. Some Muslim women have been vocal against these personal communalist laws and even seek the UCC. There is, however, some scepticism even amongst the majority community and these views come through when, as we have seen, the 21 st Law Commission itself, the tenure of which has expired in August last year, said in its consultation paper of August 31, 2018, that it is not time yet for the adoption of the Code. As Herrenschimidt summarises it: "It is necessary to further add that there was yet another powerful reason for this refusal, loudly voiced for a few years, including amongst intellectuals considered as progressive: this Code is the harbinger of a western secularism, deeply atheist, which does not suit a profoundly religious India whose 'secularism' means respect and protection for all religions." 49 The Government of India would soon constitute the new Law Commission, the 22 nd , and, it can be conjectured, would urge it to think more innovatively and courageously than its predecessor.  Despite the cautious warning of the earlier Law Commission, it appears that an irreversible movement towards securing a UCC for our country has begun. The repeated exhortations of the Supreme Court, the call of the Directive Principles as enunciated in the Constitution of India in Article 44, the political determination of the ruling political dispensation steadfastly manifest now, all make it apparent that there will soon be a push towards obtaining a wide consensus in the Parliament for a UCC for "We, the people of India". Return to Contents X. AMBEDKAR’S COUNSEL Indeed, when all is said and done, it cannot be denied that there are compelling arguments in UCC’s favour, not the least of them being that it finds mention in the list of Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution. A diversity of laws with their varying entitlements for different communities, not to mention the many inherent contradictions between them, can also pose challenges to the unity and integrity of a country that is strongly democratic and secular in nature. To think that the writer of our Constitution and the conscience-keeper of our nation, Ambedkar, resigned from the Government of India on the issue of the Civil Code, is a sobering thought for all of us. In his resignation speech he touched on the disappointment that he felt when the original intent and thrust of the Code was gradually diluted. He had special grievances against the Prime Minister Nehru, who had committed his government to the goal, but still had to make compromises in the end. In his impassioned speech he said: "To leave inequality between class and class, between sex and sex, which is the soul of Hindu Society untouched and to go on passing legislation relating to economic problems, is to make a farce of our Constitution and to build a palace on a dung heap. This is the significance I attached to the Hindu Code.  It is for its sake that I stayed on notwithstanding my differences." 50 Be that as it may, contemporary developments are moving fast. We live in another age, in another time. The world is a different place altogether: now identity and state clash, freedom and nationalism oppose each other. In the days ahead, there will be much speculation. The Modi government, in many aspects of identity and perspective, seems to have touched a chord in the hearts of the people, especially the vast Hindu majority, who unwittingly, perhaps even unthinkingly, now support the majoritarian nationalistic juggernaut that is driving this country forward single-mindedly. A UCC will not have much impact on them, as they have already been absorbed into the embrace of the Hindu code. With the Hindu Code already in existence for almost 60 years now, any major changes in that Code for the Hindus may not be feasible or called for now. In an age when citizens’ rights are of paramount significance, and the admitted position is to move towards a society which respects human rights irrespective of caste, religion, region and gender, the imperative to legislate on a UCC cannot be denied. The moot question, however, is the manner in which the country would now take steps to introduce a UCC that will also cover the Non-Hindus who are outside the Hindu Code. There are several significant questions that will have to be simultaneously addressed in this regard. Whether it is at all desirable, and if so, what form it should adopt, is the first of such questions. The assimilation of the Hindu Code, which has stood the test of time over the last six decades, into the UCC, is another. Will the four statutes forming the Code be absorbed as such into the new UCC or will they be subject to modification? To what extent will the principles behind the Hindu Code be applied, or sought to be applied, on the non-Hindus, even as preserving the cultural and religious identities of each of the other religions will necessarily have to be kept in mind? If the Hindu Code and the proposed code for the non-Hindus are kept distinct in the new UCC, could it possibly be a uniform code for everyone, or just a compendium of laws placed into the same folder? The real impact of the UCC will surely fall on those of the other religions and communities - yes, we may as well state it bluntly- the minorities, who have been guarding their respective traditions and idiosyncrasies within the diktats of their own holy books, religious practices and common law, formulated through practices, rituals and precedents. Their genuine fear is that the very special identities they have struggled to maintain in the last several centuries, will now be swept away into a uniform mould, to which everyone must adhere. If the Code clashes with certain special distinguishing features that a community or a society has treasured and cherished, will they be forced to give it up? And become of one hue and colour as all the rest? Indeed, the pitfalls are many, the most important of them being the perceived need to preserve the religious and social identity of the many peoples and communities who together constitute this pluralistic and multi religious country. But this also severely tests our claim that we are a secular country that guarantees basic and common fundamental rights to all its citizens, seems to flounder in the face of the plethora of laws and practices that proliferate in this country, insofar as our many religions, sects and denominations are concerned. It will take all the skills of accomplished political and social leadership, duly supported by the religious communities and with the benevolent touch of a crusading judiciary, for this dream to come true. But until then will it continue to be a utopian dream that will remain unrealised for years to come? Harington's words quoted at the beginning of this monograph, though in a different context, are still relevant. Can a uniform law be suitable to the genius of the people of this country who pride themselves on their variety and diversity and who may not brook any interference in what are essentially their personal and religious matters? On the other hand, when can we hope to achieve the ideal of a country where ‘we, the people' live with equity and freedom, shorn of prejudices and religious diktats that discriminate between man and man and man and woman? Ambedkar’s counsel for a "voluntary" code The essence of their doubts can be summarised as follows: at the practical level, will the UCC oust customs and practices of marriage and divorce, succession and adoption? On a more profound level, will it destroy the diversity of our nation and violate Article 25 of the Constitution that guarantees the right to practise one’s own religion. In fact, the sceptics hold that the UCC pushed through by the state, will militate against the basic tenets of democracy itself. “The secular state is, after all, an enabler of rights rather than an inhibitor in sensitive matters of religion and personal laws”. 51 Yet again, other voices may advise reflection and cautious restraint. They will argue that the Code is to cover only civil matters and surely, the collective wisdom of the people will not allow the spirit of intangible and undefinable things -- those traditions that are sanctified under personal law by usage and practice, which some hold to be the very essence of life itself -- to be brushed away in contempt. Ambedkar himself had tried to soothe agitated minds when he had argued in the debates in the Constituent Assembly. "I quite realise their feelings in the matter, but I think they have read rather too much into Article 35, which merely proposes that the State shall endeavour to secure a civil code for the citizens of the country. It does not say that after the Code is framed the State shall enforce it upon all citizens merely because they are citizens. It is perfectly possible that the future parliament may make a provision by way of making a beginning that the Code shall apply only to those who make a declaration that they are prepared to be bound by it, so that in the initial stage the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. Parliament may feel the ground by some such method." 52 [Emphasis by author] (Article 35 mentioned in theabove quote is the draft number of the article as listed during the time of the Constituent Assembly discussions, which in the final version of the Constitution was renumbered as Article 44) Should the current political leadership, demonstrating reason and maturity, wish to take a few gentle steps forward in this direction, rather than forcing the new law down unwilling throats, here then is a possible way forward: by making a beginning that the UCC shall apply only to those that are willing to adopt it; so that the application of the Code may be purely voluntary. We may finally be able to find in the voice of Ambedkar the middle ground that we can all live by. Return to Contents   [ Dr. C.K.Mathew , a retired Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer of the 1977 batch of the Rajasthan cadre was former Chief Secretary of the State. He has held several important assignments such as District Collector, Secretary / Principal Secretary to the Departments of IT, Irrigation, Mines, Power, Disaster Management and Education, apart from being Principal Secretary to the Chief Minister for five years. He has also held several posts in the Finance Department, including Additional Chief Secretary, Finance. Post-retirement, he was Senior Fellow in the Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, for four years, and was the principal investigator for a series of 3 annual reports (2016-18) on the measurement of governance in the states of India, known as the Public Affairs Index.  He was also Special Rapporteur for the Southern States under the National Human Rights Commission. He is the author of two novels and was awarded Ph.D for his thesis on symbolism in the poems of Emily Dickinson. He writes regularly for his blog, accessible at https://mathewspeak.wordpress.com . He is currently Visiting Professor at the Azim Premji University, Bangalore in the school of Public Policy and Governance. He can be reached at  [email protected] ]. Endnote: 1. A shorter version of this article ' Uniform civil code: Why and why not ' was published on July 10, 2017, at Governance Now . [https://www.governancenow.com/views/columns/uniform-civil-code-why-and-why-not]. Return To text. 2. Timesnownews.com. 2019. Uniform Civil Code by 2020? Modi govt likely to table UCC Bill in Parliament in December 2019 , October 9. [https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/uniform-civil-code-by-2020-modi-govt-likely-to-table-ucc-bill-in-parliament-in-dec/501855]. Return to Text. 3. Bharatiya Janata Party. 2019. Sankalp Patra Lok Sabha 2019 [ Manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party, 2019 ]. p. 37. [https://www.thehinducentre.com/resources/article26769375.ece/binary/BJP-Election-2019-english.pdf]. Return to Text. 4. Nair, P. 2019 . It's Time For Uniform Civil Code. This Will Help Muslims Break Taboos: Seshadri Chari , Outlook, August 29. [https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-its-time-for-uniform-civil-code-this-will-help-muslims-break-taboos-seshadri-chari/302081]. Return to Text. 5. Law Commission of India. 1958 . Fourteenth Report (Reform of Judicial Administration), Ministry of Law, Government of India, September 26, Vol. 1. [http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report14Vol1.pdf] Return to Text. 6. Banerjee, A. C. 1984 .  English Law in India , Abhinav Publications, pp. 133. [ https://books.google.co.in/books?id=7MXExXXb9usC&pg=PA134&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false ]. Return to Text. 7. Wolff, J. 1997. Religion in Victorian Britain: Culture and Empire , Manchester University Press, pp. 123. [The full text of the Proclamation by the Queen in Council to the Princes, Chiefs and people of India (published by the Governor-General at Allahabad, November 1st 1858). [https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/proclamation-by-the-queen-in-council-to-the-princes-chiefs-and-people-of-india]. Return to Text. 8. Rajagopaul, G.R. 1975. The Story of the Hindu Code, Journal of the Indian Law Institute , Vol 17, No. 14 October-December, pp. 537-558. Return to Text. 9. Chavan, N. and Kidwai, Q. J. 2006.   Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on Uniform Civil Code . Hope India Publications.  Return to Text. 10. Rajagopaul, G.R . 1975.   The Story of the Hindu Code, Journal of the Indian Law Institute, Vol 17, No 4, October-December, pp. 537-558. Return to Text. 11. Ibid. Return to Text. 12. Som, R. 1994. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code: A Victory of Symbol over Substance? Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge University Press, February, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 165-194. Return to Text. 13. Ibid. Return to Text. 14. Ibid. Return to Text. 15. Ibid. Return to Text. 16. Samaddar, R. (Ed) 2005.   The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences , SAGE Publications, pp. 56-59. Return to Text. 17. Rajagopaul, G.R. Op. Cit. Return to Text. 18. Levy, H.W. 1969. Lawyer-Scholars, Lawyer-Politicians and the Hindu Code Bill, 1921-1956. Law & Society Review , Vol 3. No. 2, Special Issue Devoted to Lawyers in Developing Societies with Particular Reference to India (November 1968 – February 1969. pp. 303-316. Return to Text. 19. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 . [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1560/3/a1955-25.pdf]. Return to Text. 20. By way of explanation, it could be said that in the Mitakshara School, largely practised in Bengal and Assam, the allocation of inherited property was based on the law of possession right from the time of birth. Self-acquired property could be passed on through the instrument of a will. Joint family property went to the group known as coparceners, i.e. those who belonged to next three generations. Therefore in Mitakshara School, sons had an exclusive right by birth in joint family property. However, in the Dayabhaga School, the doctrine of son’s birth right and the devolution of property by survivorship had limited space. The property is inherited after the death of the person who was in possession of it. It is established that in the Mitakshara School neither the father nor any other coparcener could normally disaffect the joint family property. Under the Dayabhaga School there is no such constraint and each coparcener has complete right of separation of his exclusive share in the joint family property. To put it simply, Mitakshara was based on the 'principle of ownership by birth', and Dayabagha on principle of 'ownership by death'. Return to Text. 21. Sivaramayya. n.d . Schools of Hindu Religion: Discrimination in Inheritance Law[s] , India Together . [http://www.indiatogether.org/manushi/issue100/sivarama.htm]. Return to Text. 22. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 , May 19, 1986. [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1649/3/A1956-32.pdf]. Return to Text. 23. Sarkar, S. and Sarkar, T. 2008 . Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader . Indiana University Press. pp. 490-491. Return to Text. 24. Supreme Court of India. 1985. Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors, April 23. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/823221/]. Return to Text. 25. Criminal Procedure Code 1973, Section 125. [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/6571/1/crpc.pdf]. Return to Text. 26. Lawrence, B. B and Karim, A. 2007. On Violence: A Reader . Duke University Press. pp. 265-267. Return to Text. 27. Mody, Z. 2013. Summary of "10 Judgements that changed India", Shobha De Books. Return to Text. 28. Samaddar, R. 2005. The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences . SAGE Publications.  pp. 60-63. Return to Text. 29. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 , May 19. [ http ://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1986-25_1.pdf]. Return to Text. 30. Government of Goa, 2018. Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 , Panaji.  [https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/8312/1/ocrportuguesecivilcode.pdf]. Return to Text. 31. Ibid. Return to Text. 32. Supreme Court of India. 2019 . Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira , September 13. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190351781/]. Return to Text. 33. Law Commission, Goa. 2012 . Reports of Law Commission, March 05. [http://goalawcommission.gov.in/CHAIRMAN'S%20MONOLOGUE.pdf]. Return to Text. 34. Ibid. Return to Text. 35. Almeida, A. 2016. Goa's Civil Code Shows That Uniformity Does Not Always Mean Equality , The Wire , August 08. [https://thewire.in/law/goas-uniform-civil-code-is-not-the-greatest-model-to-follow]. Return to Text. 36. Som, R.   Op Cit. pp. 165-194. Return to Text. 37. Chavan, N. and Kidwai, Q. J. 2006 . Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on Uniform Civil Code . Hope India Publications. pp. 13-20. Return to Text. 38. Law Commission of India. 2018 .  Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law, Government of India, August 31. [http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/CPonReformFamilyLaw.pdf]. Return to Text. 39. The name ABC is used to protect the identity of the party in sensitive personal cases. Supreme Court of India. 2015. Abc vs State (Nct Of Delhi), Indiankanoon.org, July 06. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162566950/]. Return to Text. 40. Ibid. Return to Text. 41. Supreme Court of India. 2019. Jose Paulo Coutinho vs Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira, September 13. [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190351781/]. Return to Text. 42. dictionary.com . jus-civile. [https://www.dictionary.com/browse/jus-civile]. Return to Text. 43. Kiralfy, A.R., Herbert Felix Jolowicz, H.F., et al. n.d . Roman law , Encyclopædia Britannica.  [https://www.britannica.com/topic/Roman-law on 19.10.2019]. Return to Text. 44. Ward, A.W. Et al. 1906 . The Cambridge Modern History Volume IX Napoleon . Cambridge University Press, p. 162.    Return to Text. 45. Ilbert, C. 1905 . The Centenary of the French Civil Code, Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 218-231. Return to Text. 46. Kantarovich, J. 1923 . The Civil Code of Russia. Yale Law Journal ; June, Vol 32, No. 8, pp. 779-789.   Return to Text. 47. Otto, J.M. 2009. Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the legal systems of twelve Muslim countries in past and present, Leiden University Press. pp. 615–16.  [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/21170]. Return to Text. 48. PRS Legislative Research. n.d. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Marriage) Bill, 2019 . Ministry of Law and Justice. [https://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/muslim-women-protection-rights-marriage-bill-2019]. Return to Text. 49. Olivier, H. 2009. The Indians' Impossible Civil Code, Published online by Cambridge University Press , Vol.50, Issue No. 2, pp. 309-347.  [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie/article/indians-impossible-civil-code/63B0AF97B897D9A065FA43CA8B73E80F]. Return to Text. 50. Moon, V. 1995 . Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar : Writings and Speeches, Dr. Ambedkar Foundation , December 06. [https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/amb/Volume_14_01.pdf]. Return to Text. 51. Rajagopal, K. 2018 . What is the debate on uniform civil code all about? , The Hindu , September 08. [https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/what-is-debate-on-uniform-civil-code-all-about/article24903560.ece]. Return to Text. 52. Lok Sabha Secretariat. 2009.   Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Official Report)  (Fifth Reprint) Volume VII, p. 551. November 23, 1948. New Delhi. [http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/Result_Nw_15.aspx?dbsl=182]. Return to Text.

The contentious issue of cow slaughter has been revived with the notification of The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules 2017(the Rules) by the Union Government. When cow slaughter was first raised in the Constituent Assembly of India, there was a move to place it under Fundamental Rights. However, by a compromise, it was placed within Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), with the caveat that it will not be implemented with coercion by the state. The Supreme Court, which initially placed DPSP (now Article 48) on a lower pedestal than the Fundamental Rights has since modified its position to treat them as equal. However, the emphasis even in Article 48 is on modern animal husbandry more than cow slaughter, and certainly there is no scope for reading into it a total, blanket ban on cow slaughter. Prima facie, then, the Rules, pose a threat to the freedom of profession of all those who are dependent on slaughter of cattle. By notifying these Rules, the Centre has encroached the jurisdiction of the State Legislatures and upended the federal spirit of the country, writes Manuraj Shunmugasundaram, Advocate, Madras High Court and National-Media spokesperson, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) . The present legal position on cow slaughter, he says, may be re-examined in due course when Writ Petitions challenging the Rules are finally heard before the Supreme Court. The author can be contacted at [email protected] Click to read this Issue Brief (HTML) [PDF 423 KB]

The Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi's announcement over television on the night of November 8, 2016, withdrawing from circulation currency notes with denominations of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000, has had a cascading effect on the economy.  This Issue Brief maps the pathways through which demonetisation impacts the informal economy. A distinction is made between sectors and categories of labour such as the self-employed, the casually employed and the micro and small enterprises operating below the realm of formal regulation. This Issue Brief points to the paradox of justifying demonetisation in terms of formalising financial markets even it has informalised labour markets. Finally, it also points out that there is little likelihood of the move benefiting the informal economy even in the long run. The author can be contacted at [email protected] Click to read this Issue Brief (HTML) [PDF 4.37 MB]

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