During this decade, disparate interests – religions, castes, classes; economic, social, geographical – were all sought to be coalesced under the rallying call: “One Nation, One...” (the second “One” periodically updated to incorporate a state or individual activity that would strike at India’s quasi-federal structure and diversity). The undercurrents that tugged India over the past 10 years are evident: the move towards a state that is majoritarian rather than plural; a government that favours big private capital to wider redistribution; and policies to benefit a few at the cost of the many. The election manifestoes of the prime contenders to power – the BJP and the INC – also delineate their ideological positions. The former promises to take forward its policies, propel India to the status of a developed country, and retains its sharp focus on cultural nationalism; the latter seeks a mandate to reverse divisive trends, with progress, equity, and inclusivity as the touchstones of its politics and policy-making.
Against this backdrop, Diego Maiorano, Senior Assistant Professor of Indian History and Politics at the University of Naples L’Orientale, comments on what the decade that has gone by meant for India’s political journey, its collective mindset, and its democratic institutions of state. He also flags the larger issues that the world’s largest electorate must contend with when it votes in the 18th LS election, scheduled to be held in seven phases from April 19 to June 01, 2024.
I. A decade of changes – transient or transformative?
As India approaches the 2024 General Election, I went through my notes on the main political events of the last 10 years wondering how the country’s polity has changed since Narendra Modi became Prime Minister. Scrolling through hundreds of articles in my archive, I realised that a lot of attention has been paid to developments which, although very important at the time they happened, might not have a lasting impact on the country’s political system.
Take, for instance, demonetisation, on which tens of thousands of words have been written. Surely, its immediate impact was debilitating: the economy suffered a heart attack from which the country—especially the large informal sector—struggled to recover. But besides revealing an erratic and unpredictable policy style, its medium-term impact will be hard to notice in a few years from now.
A similar point could be made about the recent revelations on electoral bonds. Although crucial to understand the logics underpinning the functioning of the government as well as to assess its track record, will the issue still be relevant in a couple of decades? Most probably not, as by then it will have added to a long list of exposes, which have besmirched India’s political economy. Consider, for a moment, the current relevance of scandals unearthed over the decades since Independence on the popular political psyche: not much, one could say, although they probably contributed to immediate electoral defeats – only to be re-elected as time went by.
II. Democratic and institutional erosions – reversible or not?
Of a different order, however, is the erosion of democracy witnessed over the last few years. Again, tens of thousands of words have been written, but will this political tampering have a lasting impact in, say, 20 or 30 years from now? Of course, it might be that India’s democratic institutions will not recover for a long time. Previous spasms of autocratic governance – the Emergency, above all, but also Indira Gandhi’s second term in office in the 1980s – left scars on Indian institutions 1. Take the politicised use of government institutions like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), or the erosion of the autonomy of the Supreme Court (both inaugurated by the late Mrs. Gandhi). This crimping of democratic norms contributed to shaping institutional behaviour in the decades that followed and made it more acceptable for Indian voters to tolerate abuses of power by the ruling party.
However, Indian institutions did recover substantially after 1989 2. A key reason for this is obviously the configuration of the party system, which, during periods of coalition governments, freed up breathing space for India’s institutions to reassert their autonomy and independence. As much of the fortunes of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) depend on the Prime Minister himself – in 2019, when the party won its second consecutive term, as many as one-third of the BJP’s voters said they would have not chosen the party had Mr. Modi not been the prime ministerial candidate 3 – it is far from certain that the BJP will continue to win absolute majorities in the years to come. In fact, even a relatively small decline in the party’s vote share (say 5 per cent) might result in a much more pronounced decline in the seat share, reopening the space for coalitions to play a larger role in government affairs and, in the process, limiting the reach of the central government into the functioning of other institutions of state. Civil society and the media would also likely flourish again. The Parliament would also probably reconquer a more central, and rightful, place in the country’s political life 4.
Of course, much depends on where the current phase of autocratisation stops. If a certain undefined threshold is crossed, the country might struggle to recover for a long time. If, for instance, the BJP (and its allies in business, government, and society) start fearing that in the case of an electoral defeat they will be treated as enemies (rather than rivals), a smooth transition of power could become messy; or even more blatantly, a possible erosion in the quinquennial popular collective expression that still reminds Indians that they live in a (bruised, to be sure) democratic system: free elections. (Given the heft of an aggregate of powers – money and muscle, to name two – the fairness of the elections is currently a bit of a question mark). Or, if and when the BJP eventually loses an election, and a new government retaliates in a similar fashion – persecuting rivals, arresting other parties’ leaders, stuffing institutions with their own people, and shrinking the space for free speech – the country might indeed find itself mired in a hybrid political system, from which it will be difficult to get out.
In short, although recent erosions to India’s democratic ethos might or might not be a fundamental shift from a long-term perspective; institutions, political parties, and the public at large may have to bear the scars in the near to medium run.